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In recent decades, never has a country been isolated faster than Russia as a consequence of its war on Ukraine. But there is another case of a nation whose continuous closing-off from the world in many fields (mainly the Western world) is of much bigger concern: the People’s Republic of China. Scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges, city partnerships – all these “people-to-people” exchanges are now just a shadow of what they had been ten years ago. This development stands in sharp contrast to an unwavering and remarkable increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade exchange with the country, which has grown despite COVID-19. On the other side, perhaps paradoxically, the number of foreigners in China (in particular from OECD countries) is in steady decline and they are nearly invisible in Chinese society. China itself has actively contributed to this “decoupling”, by the ideologically-driven promotion of its development model, as well as through its concept of a “dual circulation economy”. The “reform and opening policy” which began in the 1980s has, at least for the foreseeable future, come to an end – and with it many hopes and illusions in the West on what to achieve in China and how to engage with the country.

This deterioration of mutual exchange, both in quantity and in quality, began long before the current COVID-19 pandemic, which has almost completely closed off China from the rest of the world. This “sealing off” happened intentionally and in many ways: by localising management positions in international companies; by censoring and massively shutting down academic exchange programmes; by tightly controlling financial flows; and not least by the notorious and now almost impenetrable “great firewall” which led to total information control within the country.

These developments will have a substantial, detrimental impact on our relations with China: it will shape mutual perceptions; shrink opportunities for joint efforts on global challenges; and decrease the comparative advantages of international trade. It is not difficult to predict that Sino-European relations will not change for the better. Even economic ties might get looser as voices for a stronger decoupling in key technologies get louder and China’s positioning in the current Ukraine war sows further distrust.

Over the last years, most of the Western-style democracies have developed, sharpened, and specified their concepts and instruments in dealing with China. The European Union has revised its China strategy several times over the last years. The current concept from September 2021, which some refer to as the “trinity”, considers China as a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. It sounds prima facie a pragmatic and flexible approach towards the rising “Middle Kingdom”. But what are some concrete fields where it is worth putting effort on further cooperation to break through the “Great Wall” and once again open windows and doors for exchange?

• Future value-creation is largely knowledge-based. It is almost impossible not to cooperate with China given the tremendous progress Research and Development (R&D) has made over the last decade in the People`s Republic. But this requires a stable regulatory framework, especially in the field of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) to adequately share the benefits.
• The existing framework of World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations haven’t kept up with recent developments, i.e., in the data economy. There is an urgent need to adjust the existing regulatory framework. Europe should align with other regions, such as Southeast Asia, to convince China to join common efforts and prevent further fragmentation of international rules.
• For the time being at least, China is still interested in the EU’s massive common market, and Europe is stepping up its efforts to become the third global digital power. But the benefits from this can only be reaped when both partners stick to the principle of reciprocity and fair access to markets is guaranteed.

Europe must be aware that future exchange with China will happen under completely different circumstances than it did over the last thirty years. The following requirements should be met as the “Age of Innocence” is over:

• Europe must prevent the growing knowledge gap about China. The body of expertise on China in Europe is substantial and strong but also fragmented, and influence on policymaking is below its potential. Better coordination and exchange of China-related research and policy consulting must be fostered. The new Horizon Europe programme has acknowledged this deficit and supports the creation of independent knowledge networks. Europe must protect our intellectual core infrastructure from any pressure or dependency on Chinese funding. Keeping independent and free spaces of scientific and intellectual debate is key and the litmus test in any further engagement with Chinese institutions. There is still a need for higher awareness in our academic institutions as well as in political consulting and media.
• Authoritarian regimes such as China (but also Russia) are actively seeking to inject their definition of democracy into the international political discourse. Europe must resolutely defend its political concept and semantics against any attempts to redefine and blur the political core of our identity, such as democracy or our understanding of citizenship. The recent EU guidelines on foreign interference in research has long been overdue.
• Europe is not actively aiming at fundamental regime change in China. But we should not simply buy into the official Chinese narrative that there is only one – communist – way for China’s future. We must broaden our exchange with Chinese thinkers and voices others than those of the Chinese Communist Party. As strange as it might appear these days and difficult as it is, we must better understand long-term trends and be prepared for alternative developments in China.

To continue the dialogue with China is necessary, despite many discouraging experiences in the last years. But clear conditions have to be set from the European side – so as to not just be an exercise and end for itself.

After years of political tensions, representatives from the United States and the European Union are trying to mend the transatlantic partnership and leverage it to address major global challenges. The inaugural joint meeting between the EU and the US on the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) took place in September 2021 and raised the bar of future expectations.

They say love is in the eye of the beholder, and many in Brussels saw such a high-level policy forum as a testament to a rekindled transatlantic relationship. The EU sees this as an opportunity with potential spillovers in the areas of climate change, upholding democracy, and reducing trade and defence tensions. For Brussels, the TTC is as an open platform for transatlantic cooperation and global engagement.

However, for the time being, Washington’s eyes are mostly on China. All of the ten joint working groups established under the TTC have a direct bearing on the most pressing challenges coming from Beijing. From technology standards and secure supply chains to investment screening and export controls, one can clearly see what whets the appetite of the US administration. For Washington, the TTC is a specific tool mainly for transatlantic cooperation on China containment.

China’s rise, of course, is an acute concern for the European Union, as well. The economic onslaught of state-backed Chinese digital companies internationally and Beijing`s aggressive posturing on trade, investment, and military-related issues is raising red flags in European capitals. The US fixation on China might seem a bit over the top for some more dovish European leaders who want to navigate the situation aptly and avoid confrontation; however, the TTC is a chance that must be seized for overlapping trans-Atlantic interests.

How should the EU position itself in the upcoming TTC meetings? On which fronts should we press ahead and on which should we stand our ground when negotiating with the US?

Green Light

The TTC needs to be part of a comprehensive effort to contain China and also secure vital European interests internationally. When it comes to China, we need to oppose the Chinese Communist Party, whose authoritarian leadership is becoming a threat to NATO Allies and other like-minded partners. Rigorous foreign investment screening needs to saw off corrosive capital channelling from Beijing which aims to buy positive narratives, influence, and economic dependencies. Joint EU-US export controls on our advanced technologies, which end up in the hands of autocrats, is extremely needed, if it isn’t too late already. Moreover, common technological standards should protect European and American citizens from foreign technology riddled with vulnerabilities and personal data scrapers. These tools should act as a deterrent and help us consolidate a joint tech front.

The EU should ensure that the long-term success of the TTC also entails raising the bar of personal data protection within the US. It is embarrassing to remember that in 2020, the European Court of Justice invalidated the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework under which data was shared across the Atlantic. The American personal data regime doesn`t provide sufficient safeguards that European data flows are handled adequately, due to official US government surveillance. If the two economic blocks are to stand united on trade and technology, fixing data flows is the basic pre-condition for a successful Tech Alliance.

The linkage with climate change is more nuanced and uncertain. The only pertinent point from the first TTC meeting is the reference to ‘climate and green tech’. Again, this is covertly aimed at China as the country dominates solar panel and battery cell production. The Asian hegemon is also in a leading position for the extraction and processing of critical raw materials essential to renewable infrastructure. For the time being, investing heavily in renewables, batteries, and clean tech effectively means directly subsidising China. The TTC should alter this trend. If Brussels plays its cards right, the TTC could also become a potential springboard to convince Washington on the future implementation of a transatlantic carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) that negates carbon leakages to global polluters with lower environmental standards such as Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Mexico. This would be a hard sell to the Americans, but the EU should pursue it nonetheless.

Red Light

The EU should make sure that the TTC isn’t exploited as a forum where the US government tries to apply pressure to water down existing European tech regulation. Issues such as competition law in the digital realm, personal data rights or content regulation concern our internal market of 450 million Europeans. Actually, the US Department of Justice and many American lawmakers on both sides of the aisle share some of the serious issues we are trying to address in the digital domain. European member states already folded on the question of a fair digital tax across the EU under severe pressure from the US. The EU has to stand its ground on digital issues within the TTC.

On the trade front, the TTC shouldn’t be an excuse for the EU not to strengthen its own arsenal on responding to external pressure. In a best-case scenario, the joint EU-US forum would be an insurance policy for Brussels that we can react jointly on global trade challenges or threats to our supply chains. However, wounds are still fresh from the steel and aluminium tariff disputes between the EU and the US, which were imposed by Washington on extremely shaky ‘national security’ grounds. China’s ban on Lithuanian exporters and targeted economic sanctions on the Baltic nation are an additional case in point. The EU needs to be able to respond and deter such whims with unilateral instruments at its disposal. The recently unveiled anti-coercion trade tool by Commissioner Dombrovskis is an extremely positive sign that the EU is not dragging its feet while others are sharpening axes.

This is not a trade negotiation but the EU should pay attention that it doesn’t repeat some mistakes from the past, which derailed the TTIP agreement several years ago. There should be maximum transparency of the whole TTC process and active engagement with all related political, business, industry, and civil stakeholders from across the Atlantic.

Regulating autonomous vehicles is not only a question of finding solutions in connection with the technical aspects of the legal framework. Rather, it involves making preliminary policy-based decisions that take all stakeholders into consideration. This article makes the case that efforts must focus on how to incentivise the use of autonomous vehicles without putting the burden on the shoulders of those who will ultimately make use of them. In that respect, the existing regulation (implemented on the basis of the Product Liability Directive and the Motor Insurance Directive) is insufficient, as there is a considerable mismatch between the current framework and the challenges posed by autonomous vehicles. There is a need to act urgently on the regulatory level.

Read the full article of the June 2020 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

On 22 June, Amnesty International, a non-governmental organisation, published a story on Moroccan journalist and human rights defender Omar Radi, whose smartphone was reportedly bugged. Amnesty’s investigation of the case found traces of so-called ‘network injection’—a cyberattack in which an outside actor inserts a program in the target’s device in order to gain access to its content, including email and browsing history.

Network injection attacks are usually carried out by tricking the target into opening malicious links, often sent via SMS and WhatsApp, which then infect the target’s device with malware. According to Amnesty, the spyware program used in the Radi case was Pegasus, developed by an Israeli firm to track COVID-19 cases in Israel.

In Israel, this technique is used with full transparency, and amidst a healthy debate on its benefits and drawbacks. However, it’s worth mentioning that the technique itself can, of course, also be used to track and monitor political opponents. This creates a clear and present danger of authoritarian overreach, as witnessed in China and Russia, for example.

Amnesty accused Moroccan authorities of the attack, a charge which Morocco denied, asking Amnesty for material evidence. As presented by Amnesty, the case itself is a human rights violation due to the use of spyware against a journalist doing his job, since the journalist’s smartphone was tapered with and infected with malware in order to track and survey him.

But the Omar Radi case also reveals a more significant issue, which deserves to be discussed. And yet, for obvious reasons, it is often hidden and avoided in public. Cybersecurity has become more and more relevant in the past 20 years. This is directly related to the growing combined threats of international terrorism, trafficking, and smuggling, which bedevil relations between Europe and its neighbours.

The technology at the core of the Radi case (i.e., spyware used to penetrate phones and other forms of electronic communication) is, by nature, multi-faceted. It can (and is) used by friends and foes alike: terrorists, traffickers, and the agencies trying to combat them. Over the years, this technology has progressed and become much more sophisticated, as well as much harder to trace.

Electronic surveillance is, of course, taking place inside the EU as well, mostly used by state actors. But since the technology has developed and become more user-friendly, it’s also accessible to non-state actors (such as criminal organisations and terrorists). Network injection itself is, in a sense, a ‘tip of the spear technology’ when it comes to tracking technologies. Also, in order to be effective, direct contact with a phone (or some other device) and the network used is necessary.

It’s hardly a surprise that authorities across the board are keen to embrace such ready-to-use technology that can help keep track of what they consider hostile or politically disruptive individuals and organisations. The line between what constitutes genuinely nefarious and dangerous cases, and what does not, should be easy to draw. However, it sometimes isn’t. Accessibility makes various types of spyware tempting to use, even when it’s not necessary. However, when their use by authorities crosses the line, they often create individual casualties in the process.

Simultaneously, the very nature of cyber technology such as spyware makes it ripe for clandestine applications, and therefore not necessarily open to a more public debate.

So, when a case like the Radi one appears, even if it takes place outside the EU, it should be seen as a chance for the Union. It is a chance to discuss and learn from the issue of how cybersecurity, and the technology used to enhance it, ought to be managed, protecting individuals and societies alike, as well as avoiding abuse and malicious overreach.

The issues at stake are critical for the EU as well, since we do have similar technology (oftentimes purchasing the same software), and the balancing act of individual integrity and societal security is linked across borders. There is to date no common EU policy towards these issues. That needs to change, and a way to start is to address the difficult problems tied to integrity and security on an EU-wide level.

Credits: Image by geralt on Pixabay

In some years, I will probably see the current period of COVID-19 outbreak as an era, which has changed nearly everything. From the patterns of my work (very productive online cooperation, which, however, may give some employers additional tools for surveillance) to social life (offline limitations and online chances). From education (the new architecture of my remote classes with students, which requires the proper quality of the network), to the new schemes of digital cultural participation. Think of the excellent online performances enjoyed by all of us, such as the concert of Andrea Bocelli from the empty cathedral in Milano.

Paradoxically, this completely unpredictable disease has become the global game-changer, influencing both the current times and the future. The COVID-19 experience clearly shows what was, and is, most important: a substantial increase in the significance of digital opportunities. The new, post-Corona world will become more digital than we could ever have imagined.

One part of me is afraid of this digital breakthrough. The other is full of hope.

Firstly, use the data efficiently and adequately!

Algorithms and Artificial Intelligence (AI) can predict the trajectories of COVID-19’s dissemination (through modelling) and prepare warning policies, including for the second and possible third wave of the outbreak.

These predictions depend on the massive delivery of the data needed. How to collect it? As it was done one month ago by Deutsche Telecom, without the possibility of identifying individuals (the data was provided to the Robert Koch Institute in aggregated form). We can also follow the experiment of South Korea with the possibility of identifying individuals, legally introduced to know more about human contacts (tracing): the new algorithmic solution with full automation of all processes reduced contact-tracing time from 24 hours to 10 minutes.

The special apps and data will be a crucial instrument for health crisis management, or rather the e-management of the health crisis.

Such applications should be voluntary (but 60% of participation is needed for efficiency) for us, citizens, as the European Commission suggests; they should also be based on privacy protection (proportionate and targeted use) with a growing awareness of the need for consent given by an individual. Clearly, these apps should use anonymised data. Additionally, they could use the decentralised model of collecting data by Bluetooth instruments, which is currently offered by Google and Apple. Of course, it should be known what kind of data retention rules ought to be implemented, for what period of time, and how to include the terms of the “sunset clause” into some solutions. In some cases, we need to consider how to make legitimate use of the GDPR. In all cases, we should check what the impact of those digital tools on civil rights is. This is the only way to avoid tensions and redundant controversies.

All those principles must function as a European approach, with a full agreement between the European Commission, the Member States, and the European Data Protection Supervisor.

Secondly, be connected!

The question is whether the parameters of connectivity are sufficient. The current experience shows deficits and the necessity for improvement. For example, the lack of accessibility to the Internet in rural areas (it turns out this is a major issue in the US). On a global level, there is a deficit of the possibilities to use networks in developing countries (low level of quality and access). And this is to say nothing of the enormous lack of digital literacy among many groups, especially elderly people. Additionally, we see a lack of full semantic interoperability of operational systems or software in Europe, which hinders cooperation in many areas, including in healthcare, which is now proving crucial. 

Digital opportunities revealed, at the same time, the growing threat of the digital divide. Hence, we need to accelerate the works on 5G implementation, fully taking into account the challenge of cybersecurity and the need to build a European system of certificates and skills for risk analysis and management. My view is clear, and often in contradiction to those of experts and governments. We should not postpone these works.

Thirdly, build trust!

Trust is essential for two reasons: cybersecurity and privacy. The more digital we are, the more threats we face.

On the cybersecurity front, we are seeing a new context. The massive scale of mobile devices and communication channels used is already provoking cybercrime organisations to expand their activities. These actors range from mafia groups to the completely out of control Darknet, to some states conducting digital industrial espionage or disinformation campaigns. There are many reports demonstrating Chinese and Russian involvement in disinformation measures. There are also many instances of new forms of digital espionage and hacking activities.

Necessary resilience should be guaranteed by the proper institutions, such as ENISA, Europol, as well as the member states and tech companies, but also by all of us, ready to use the “cyber hygiene” tools. The key challenge is to convince citizens in all member states that data is like the air (not only like oil): we need it to be able to breathe and to function.

Also, the significance of artificial intelligence is undeniable. It is high time to discuss the European Strategy on AI (White Paper), and clearly and publicly show why we need AI and how it should be governed (by law and by oversight, with what kind of partners, based on ethical norms and standards). We must also avoid mistakes by creating potential discriminatory schemes.

This is the opportunity to make a giant leap, combining new digital tools and AI, and changing the paradigm of the healthcare model. We need to speed up clinical trials for the COVID-19 vaccine, work on biotechnologies useful for new medicines, have better diagnostic instruments, as well as personalised recognition and therapies.

Sitting at home, seeing the coming of spring outside the window, I cannot stop thinking about the growing digital opportunities during the outbreak. The conclusion is simple: we must seize these opportunities. This is the digital game-changer momentum.

This week Mark Zuckerberg appeared before Congress in Washington D.C. to testify over two consecutive days in relation to the Cambridge Analytica scandal. The CEO of Facebook addressed a series of allegations, previously assumed but before now, never fully proven or confirmed at such high-level by a company representative. This personal blog briefly highlights the most important political takeaways which could have significant policy implications and are likely to remain matters for growing public concern within the EU.

Facebook is a monopoly. Facebook faces competition from other social media platforms or rival apps, but only in overlapping areas. The company does not have actual competition in today`s market and there is no single competing entity offering a similar bundle of services.

The company can`t cope. The narrative that a social network with so many users can self-regulate and monitor content independently and successfully remains untrue. The CEO of the company admitted that tracing hate speech and monitoring disturbing video content posted in an array of different languages, fast and effectively, is a persistent and insurmountable challenge. The copious number of languages and linguistic nuances employed and the millions of posts every day, means that there is no fully efficient ‘check’ against dangerous content or misleading/untrue facts which can distort markets and impact democracies.

Journalistic investigations have also questioned the actual amount of fake profiles engaged in fraudulent activities or phony accounts which are part of businesses seeking to sell online influence and artificial social engagement. Facebook has regularly pledged to address this issue, but the company has thus far refrained from admitting how much of its 2 billion user base has in fact been corrupted. 

Facebook is at war with Russian operators. Mark Zuckerberg openly confirmed that the company has not fulfilled its responsibilities in terms of data privacy, fake news and foreign interference in elections. He further commented that his company is engaged in a persistent battle with Russian operators, attempting to exploit the social network.

In his words: ‘This is an arms race. They’re going to keep getting better’. This statement is nothing new but is a stark reminder that the upcoming 2019 European Parliament elections might be a target for the disinformation warfare lead by Moscow.  

Personal data costs money. Prior to the recent scandal, the majority of Facebook users had little or no idea that their data was used for side purposes and also by third parties. Data costs money and Facebook provides a free service for the users by running ads. That is how Zuckerberg explained the business model of the social media in a nutshell.

However, this free service is supported by users ‘selling’ their own data at an unset price and by ‘signing’ a flawed contract with an abundance of fine print.

On Facebook ‘consent’ is an empty concept. Prior to 2015 Facebook`s Application Programme Interface (API) allowed third-party applications (after receiving user consent with a single click) to gather the data of the respective user, as well as the data of their Facebook connections. Granted, this was done after the original users had given their ‘consent’ to the third-party app but most users did not  make an informed choice to share such a wealth of personal data and also expose their online friends.

Most importantly, users were not properly informed that in giving their consent with a click, they were delegating their personal information (and their friends’ data) to a third party, outside of Facebook`s platform and servers.

Facebook applies certain standards of accountability, respect of privacy and transparency when it comes to storing personal data within its servers. However, the company has been negligent in its handling of personal information and has de facto given it to third parties, without having created or implemented the necessary mechanisms for controlling these third parties.

Cambridge Analytica is a case in point. Even after the infamous company assured that it had deleted the personal data it had accumulated, Facebook had no instrument to verify this and only years later was it confirmed that Cambridge Analytica had lied. Again, it should be reiterated that most users have never given their full and informed consent and do not have comprehensive knowledge that third parties have been using, storing, studying and even archiving their personal data, away from the Facebook servers completely unchecked by private or public scrutiny.

The European Union should set the global standard on data protection. The CEO of Facebook recently hinted that parts of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which comes into force in late May 2018, could be applied by the company not only in Europe but on a global scale. During the recent public testimony, he stated that the company may implement a different set of parameters given the `different sensibilities in the U.S.` but Facebook remains committed to installing necessary controls and tools for affirmative consent.

This remains only a promise. The current gaping legislative hole in the U.S. is likely to be addressed soon and it is probable that GDPR will serve as a template. The EU should acknowledge this and further increase its effort to set a global standard for data protection and privacy in terms of trade and the conducting of business with third countries.  

Tread lightly but regulate. The question of regulating social media companies is becoming ever more pertinent. This is a considerable challenge given the growing ecosystem of start-ups and innovative companies which should not be stifled by cumbersome legislation. Zuckerberg himself confirmed during the hearing that regulating social media companies is inevitable and he is open to providing support for such an idea. The U.S. and EU legislators will have to make decisions fast and walk into the unknown land of tougher social media regulatory oversight.

Facebook is currently acting as an intermediary in news spreading, financial transactions and broadcasting live content, but it is far from being classified as a media, financial service or broadcasting company in the strict legal sense. Facebook is one of the global brands which are redefining classical concepts of competition and have used this opportunity to grow their business on a massive scale.

Such innovative companies are welcome as they provide new services, improve lives and create employment opportunities. However, they remain mostly unchecked and recent developments have proven that users are in a vulnerable position, particularly exposed to data breaches, and in some instances, platforms can be used for nefarious purposes with detrimental global impact. Legislation 2.0 is urgently needed

Looking back over time, we can see that the Information Age has made our economies and our society knowledge-driven; our main drivers of growth have become based on pushing bits up and down (digital services) and on connectivity improvements which have made delivering those bits quicker, and ubiquitous, all throughout the world. In sum, we are assembling the “space shuttle” for globalisation.

In today’s world, the biggest transport company doesn’t own a single car. The foremost house rental company doesn’t own a single house or apartment. The space race is being carried out not by state agencies but by energy, automotive and online payment companies (SpaceX founded by Elon Musk), by a company that started as a record shop (Virgin Galactic, founded by Sir Richard Branson) and even by the world’s biggest retail company (Blue Origin, founded by Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos).

The car industry is being challenged by Internet companies which have yet to produce a single car. Recently, an Internet/TV company went global, disrupting the TV industry’s decades-long reign. Trade is global, companies are going global; the workforce and talent pool are becoming more and more global as well.

In the time since we have unleashed the information society, our economies have undergone incredible transformation, causing me to wonder, “Are we taking this transformation seriously?” I don’t think so.

Our so-called modern societies, democracies, governments and institutions are still not organised with an agile mindset that will enable them to engage in decision-making and policy-making that is able to cope with such transformation and speed. The way we think and govern this transformation is still rooted in a sectoral approach, not focused or centred on the citizen.

Governments, politicians and institutions should give to digital policies the same weight, the same holistic approach which they do for those dealing with education, health, social issues, the economy and even foreign affairs and defence.

We fail to consider how the digital transformation is being disseminated horizontally, economically and across sectors (e.g. in education, health, manufacturing, farming, etc.) and how vertically it is impacting our society.

The Internet has become the veins of the modern economy and of modern society — and data the lifeblood within, rendering cyberspace analogous to The Good, the Bad and the Ugly for every middle-aged or older politician.

The Good, because it has brought about increases in productivity and therefore growth; the Bad, because it has increased inequality and has apparently led to lower incomes and to the erosion of low-skilled jobs; and the Ugly, because it has been regarded as an unruly space facilitating cyberattacks, fake news and terrorism.

We must then prepare our society and institutions for the radical change that is underway. Governments, politicians and institutions should give to digital policies the same weight, the same holistic approach which they do for those dealing with education, health, social issues, the economy and even foreign affairs and defence.

At EU level, this Commission (EC) has built a political structure to underpin the Digital Single Market (DSM) for concentrating efforts on the market dimension horizontally. Still lacking, however, is proper coordination or structure on cyber-diplomacy in order to address and promote a values-based and a rules-based global cyberspace — an EU Digital Ambassador is needed.

In the European Parliament (EP), digital affairs are done either in the Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) Committee or in the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO). But due to the cross-sector nature of the digital files, some files end up having five committees involved. This brings slowness and lack of agility on delivering pieces of legislation: a Digital Affairs Committee is badly needed!

In the Council of the EU (Council), whilst digital files are discussed in the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council configuration (TTE) and in the Competitiveness Council configuration (COMPET), most of these files end up being dealt with in more than just one Council configuration, within the framework of a particular sector, thus losing the horizontal vision needed in the digital transformation. Here, and again, it’s about time to devise a Digital Affairs Council.

A Digital Affairs Council would bring together a specially designated digital minister from every Member State, who would address the “digital present” but also devise a borderless and human-centred digital future. A digital minister would enable its Member State to no longer regard the digital realm merely as a sector, framed within his country’s own borders.

As a matter of fact, with digitalisation taking place in every sector, citizens will also be equally demanding toward their respective Member States, either in terms of “public” services or public policies: soon, domestic policies will have to deal with algorithms and the virtual world as well. 

Concerns over privacy must be addressed, as do other recent phenomena, such as cyberbullying and online behaviour. We should be looking at how new digital technologies are re-shaping the family structure as we have traditionally conceived it, at how they are affecting our sense of time, our critical-thinking capacity to evaluate information and our standards of knowledge themselves — which are fundamentally changing our perceptions of the world. Before long, we should be questioning which values we want to preserve and nurture in a society that is turning digital.

New generations born in a hyper-connected world will hardly understand the concepts of borders or sovereignty — even the languages which are seen by today’s generations as barriers will be transformed by technology into enablers. We need to cope with their aim for flexibility — working from anywhere to reach everyone in the world.

It’s being said that globalisation and digitalisation are destroying jobs — or at least destroying more than they create. I’m not fully convinced of this; I believe there will be changes in jobs rather than losses: changes, for example, from low-skilled to high-skilled work.

Governments should thus be preparing society for a massive movement of workers from one profession to another, putting the right employment and social policies in place to incentivise workers, and encouraging the private sector to invest more in skilling, up-skilling and re-skilling human capital.

In the same way, discussions have started to appear regarding what some call “the negative effects of automation”. The ideas range from Universal Basic Income to taxing robots, although the point remains valid that “there is no single magic bullet for poverty” and inequality. But these tools can be valuable instruments when contextualised within a broader strategy — such as an education, fiscal and social reform — and targeted such as to maximise effectiveness.

We need to prepare future generations for jobs that don’t yet exist. For this, deep reform of our educational systems is of the utmost importance. Kids should master creativity, critical thinking, communications and adaptability. Throughout their lives, they will have to face a world in rapid and constant change, in which their ability to adapt to this change will be key to surviving. We must nurture a natural process of learning, unlearning and relearning.

Quick adaptability to change, therefore, is key to success, be it at EU level or Member State level, in the public or the private sector, or even at the level of the individual. 

While most attention over the past few years has been centred on Russia’s aggression and the critical situation in the Middle East, very few analysts notice a security emergency on the EU’s south-eastern border. 

Only in 2016, the Greek General Staff recorded 1,671 national airspace violations by Turkish aircraft. The size of this breach can be easier understood if one considers that, during the same period, NATO jets scrambled to intercept Russian military planes 780 times, which is the highest recorded number since the Cold War.

The root of tensions in the Aegean is Ankara’s efforts to question the existing status quo in the area, both in the air and at sea. This antagonism has led the two countries three times (1976, 1987 and 1996) to the brink of war. According to international norms, the national airspace should correspond to territorial waters. However, Greece, since 1931, established its airspace to 10nm, while its territorial waters remain at 6nm. This international paradox was never challenged by Turkey before its invasion in Cyprus.

The reasoning behind the Turkish stance derives from its claims that the 4nm difference between Greek airspace and its territorial waters should be considered as international space over which Greece has no authority. The situation became more complex when, in 1995, the Turkish Parliament declared that any possible extension of the Greek territorial waters up to a limit of 12nm – and subsequently the national airspace – would automatically result in an act of war (casus belli).

Over the space of the past seventeen years, Turkish fighter jets – many of them equipped with combat arms – have been violating Greek airspace (see below), resulting in interception attempts by Greek forces and, in many cases, dangerous air engagements and dogfights, even over inhabited islands of the Eastern Aegean.

Photo source: Global Military Review

In reality, Turkey’s revisionism in the Aegean can be traced to its existential fear of possible geopolitical, economic and military isolation. Taking into consideration the political instability and security threats that the country is facing over the space of the past five years, one could easily understand how fragile peace on NATO’s Eastern flank is. In that frame, Erdogan’s rhetoric on possible change and renegotiation of the Lausanne Treaty – which defined, in 1923, the boundaries of the modern state of Turkey – endangers not only Greco-Turkish relations, but the entire South-East Mediterranean region.

The frequency of Turkish violations and infringements also dramatically affects and puts in harm’s way civil aviation in the area. The concentration of the Greek islands, coupled with the intensity and the heights that the warplanes can reach, increase the probability of another fatal accident in the Aegean, as has happened in the past.  

Another important aspect of this secret war is the financial cost. According to Greek officials, every time a Greek fighter jet scrambles, the cost rises to €8,000 – €12,000 per hour. Of course, in the case of collision, this cost exceeds the €50,000,000 per plane without counting the loss of human lives. As it is easily understood, these numbers for a country in deep recession are onerous and deprive other sectors more vital for the daily life of the Greek citizen of important resources.  

Unfortunately, during the last four decades, the EU and especially NATO, have not paid the necessary attention to Turkish bellicosity. It is evident that the Turkish political and diplomatic fluctuations should alert the West. Impartiality and apathy with regards to Turkish hostile behaviour towards its neighbours should not be the norm.

Erdogan and Putin’s recent marriage of convenience has raised many analysts’ doubt over Turkey’s intentions. Therefore, NATO should not underestimate the fact that Greece remains the oldest member of both NATO and the EU in the region, committing – even under the current horrendous financial situation – 2.38% of her GDP to defence, and thus to the Western alliance.

In fact, the Aegean dispute has not been adequately debated. It is not solely a Greco-Turkish problem. It should be perceived as an EU problem, as Greece is called upon to protect the Union’s external borders in the vital region of the Eastern Mediterranean. The EU should finally define, in the clearest terms, its current land, sea and air borders, in order to be prepared to protect them against any external threat.

An idea would be the creation of a common European airspace, by establishing territorial sea and airspace 12nm, throughout the EU. This decision might discourage further provocations and hostile acts by third countries, as well as defusing tensions between the two bitter friends in the Aegean.   

The free movement of persons, goods, services and capital is the basis of the European Single Market. It is one of the most successful achievements of European Union, bringing jobs to the European citizens and growth to the European economy.

The four freedoms were enshrined in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, laying the groundwork for a functioning single market, since then, however, technological progress has changed our economies.  How can the European Single Market adapt and keep pace?  With a 5th freedom: the free movement of data.

A fifth freedom?

The concept of a 5th freedom was coined by, Janez Potočnik, former European Commissioner for Science and Research,  in April 2007  by calling for the ‘freedom of knowledge’. He aimed to improve Europe’s ability to remain competitive in terms of knowledge and innovation, as ’the cornerstones of prosperity’, he argued.

In this blogosphere, Bruno Maçães, former  Portuguese Secretary of State for European Affairs, defended the freedom of knowledge by proposing reforms to transform the single market. He called this ‘knowledge mobility’, considering the rapid and borderless nature of the digital economy.

Freedom of knowledge and knowledge mobility can be achieved with the free movement of data.

The new fabric

Data is the raw material in the digital world, a good with major socio-economic value which can unleash the potential of the data economy expected to reach € 566 billion by 2020 (European Commission). It is a key driver for increasing Europe’s competitiveness and economic growth in order to ensure the continued well-being of EU citizens as they face the challenges of globalisation.

90% of today’s global data has been created in the last two years alone. And data will keep on growing. Data is produced largely by people while interacting on the internet — foremost via pictures and videos, as well by an ever-increasing number of connected devices, such as smartphones and sensors (a.k.a. the IoT – Internet of Things), which gather climate information, satellite imagery, GPS signals, and much more.

When analysed, all this data represents a land of opportunity. It has the potential to transform raw data into useful information to build up knowledge, and to enable that knowledge to utilise higher orders of intelligence in all sectors of society. It can bring greater efficiency and productivity to services, lowering delivery costs. It can create new and innovative services and business models, making the digital economy a major driver for growth and jobs. It can help us solve major societal challenges. It can even be used to make governments more accountable, more transparent and better at policy-making.

DIKW Pyramid (Ackoff)

But are we letting data move freely in Europe like we do for persons, goods, services and capitals? What can the free movement of data bring?

Let’s take the example of a self-driving car. The car receives data from a traffic light that has turned red. This is then processed: the red traffic light is identified as a stop signal. But what happens if data cannot move freely among connected devices (in this case, between the traffic light and the car)? Or what happens if the car crosses a national border?

Consider another scenario. have you ever been to a doctor while abroad? You are seated opposite the doctor, but your medical records remain at home. This can lead to a tricky situation, besides the difficulty of being ‘lost in translation’ between the foreign language and medical lingo. But if the doctor can access your medical history, this whole process can be facilitated and a more informed decision can be taken.

The European Commission, in its Digital Single Market Strategy, identifies the economic and societal growth potential of data technologies such as Big Data, Cloud Computing and the IoT.

After the European Cloud Initiative, the Digitalisation of Industry Initiative and the Internet Connectivity Package, the Commission is due to present the European ‘free flow of data’ initiative. It will tackle restrictions on the free movement of data and on the location of data for storage or processing purposes. It’s been said that by removing data restrictions, the EU could generate € 8 billion per year in GDP.

This initiative should balance societal and economic benefits. It should address, properly and clearly, data ownership, liability and portability (encompassing confidentiality, availability, privacy and integrity) in order to achieve trust.

Digital leadership

The four freedoms opened many opportunities in the European Single Market, increasing the well-being of European citizens. With the freedom of data, we will not just keep pace but power greater innovation. And innovation is the only way to grow.

We must take the lead in unleashing the potential of data and in rooting our values and standards in today’s globalised and competitive digital economy.

The ‘free flow of data’ initiative may well be just the first step; to go further, we must show political leadership and vision: to add and open when reactionary forces push to remove and close.

By creating more barriers to the free flow of data, as a protectionist reaction, we are not increasing security. The centralisation or the closing of the data is as interesting for hackers as a honey pot is for bees.

So, in order to enable the Single Market to truly go digital, we must add a 5th gear to our engine. To fuel this, Europe must add to its core freedoms the free movement of data.

References:

Ackoff, R. L., (1989) “From Data to Wisdom”, Journal of Applies Systems Analysis, Volume 16, pp 3-9.

Bellinger, G., Castro, D., Mills, A., (2004) “Data, Information, Knowledge, and Wisdom”, System-thinking

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime has taken control of the traditional media in Russia: TV, radio and newspapers. As Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has stated, the Kremlin sees the mass media as a ‘weapon’.

Now Russia’s leadership is trying to take control of social media too, and for this massive operation a new information warfare tool has been mobilised—an army of fake social media Putin-fans, known as ‘trolls’.

My investigation has discovered that coordinated social media propaganda writers are twisting and manipulating the public debate in Finland, too. Trolls and bots distribute vast amounts of false information in various languages, and target individual citizens for aggressive operations.

Aggressive trolls have created a feeling of fear among some of my interviewees, causing them to stop making Russia-related comments online. Trolling has had a serious impact on freedom of speech, even outside Russia.

Thus, it should be viewed as a national security threat that needs to be addressed accordingly. The question is: how should the Kremlin’s trolls and disinformation be countered?

Read the full articlein the June 2016 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

The security threats Europe is now facing, such as hybrid warfare, propaganda campaigns and information warfare, frequently include a digital dimension. At the same time, digital tools offer an immense potential for change in the European neighbourhood, not least in their ability to equip and inspire pro-democracy protesters, particularly those facing a repressive security apparatus.

Digital policy cannot therefore become an afterthought but needs to be deeply integrated into Europe’s foreign policy and diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, the US’s long-held Internet hegemony is beginning to fade, placing the EU in a good position to lead global Internet governance initiatives and ensure that they develop along open and liberal lines.

Read the full articlein the June 2016 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

A lot has been said about the impact of the digital world on science, technology and the entertainment industry. However, little attention has been paid to innovation—or lack thereof—in the political system. This article argues that the political system is out of sync with the times. It explores the causes of this and proposes some avenues for institutional innovation. The aim is not to propose a solution or a roadmap. Rather, it is to ask the questions that need to be asked and push the boundaries in terms of what could be done, all in the hope of moving the debate forward.

The Internet is bringing about a seachange in how citizens expect to be represented. Governments, however, are unable to keep up with the changes that it has provoked in our societies. The world changes by the second, and yet our governments are still only receiving citizen input every two, four or five years, depending on the system. Modern democracies are based on information technology that is five hundred years old, the printing press.

With this information technology, the best possible system that could be designed was one whereby a few make daily decisions for the many, and the many vote on who represents them once every few years. Long-term representation made sense at a time when citizens could not participate in the decision-making process. This was not physically possible, nor did the citizens have access to the information required to make informed decisions.

One could argue that, in the eighteenth century, someone like John Adams knew pretty much everything there was to know about running a country, but that is far from true today. The increased complexity of the issues we face, from climate change to the global financial markets, makes it impossible for our representatives to come up with innovative and long-term solutions on their own. We are in the middle of a global crisis of representation. Governments simply do not seem to be able to respond to the demands of our rapidly changing society.

Technological connectivity has multiplied access to and circulation of information at a very low cost. Conversations that used to be one-to-many have become many-to-many. The Internet has the potential to transform us all into producers as well as consumers of information, and we can now participate remotely in any global conversation.

Read for FREE the full article published in the June 2015 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Our society is living in turbulent, yet exciting times: an unprecedented political crisis on the European level is shaking up the political status quo, leaving no stone unturned. Europeans have begun to realise that they live in a more complex, interdependent and connected era than ever before.

Citizens are now questioning the current political situation and are not satisfied with the means of participation. Where European politics is concerned, many citizens do not feel sufficiently informed and are unable to get actively involved. According to the latest Eurobarometer results, more than 50 % of European citizens feel ‘that their voice is not heard’ on the EU level (European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication).

However, democratic processes, and policymaking tools especially, remain very traditional. Voting for representatives during elections is still the primary source of legitimacy in the law-making process—with only rare ‘adventurous’ participatory exceptions, for example in the Nordic countries.

The desire for more legitimacy in representative democracy, combined with the unprecedented technological possibilities available for realising greater citizen involvement, is exciting for citizens and political actors alike, as its achievement would offer a more encompassing assessment of society’s sentiments. Existing digital communication tools that are readily available and just waiting to be exploited are expected to improve the quality of democracy through an increase in citizen participation. Most promisingly, digital methods can improve the dialogue between civil society on the one hand, and elected officials and political parties on the other.

This article will address crowdsourcing in democratic processes and especially how the process of crowdsourcing legislation can be implemented by political parties to augment democratic processes. One example of how legislation can be crowdsourced will be presented in greater detail, and the implications for the citizens who participate in the process will be discussed. The article will look at possible challenges to crowdsourcing activities and then conclude with recommendations on how political parties can use this new technology effectively.

Read the full FREE article published in the June 2015 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Information technology permeates almost every aspect of our lives. The reason is simple. When a system is well designed, it makes everything better: speed, reliability, security, efficiency, convenience and capabilities are all increased, most often by many orders of magnitude.

No one would dream of running a bank without the computers and software that are the central nervous system of any institution. Every time you fly in a plane you put your life in the ‘hands’ of a computer for most of the trip, albeit with some human supervision. If you happen to be in hospital in critical condition, your life-support system is likely to be controlled by software run by a computer.

We twenty-first century humans trust computers with the most difficult, the most critical and the most important tasks of our personal lives. It therefore seems strange that technology is largely absent from important areas of government, which is not taking advantage of the significant benefits that we are now used to everywhere else. One area where developments in technology have been especially slow is in the process of enabling democracy. Enormous opportunities in this area remain unrealised: citizen engagement, real-time participation, communication between government and constituents, and elections.

This article discusses government elections from start to finish. It focuses on polling station voting. All around the world, from the most developed countries to the most challenged ones, running a successful, clean election is the first step towards true democracy. The process of assuring the eligibility and enfranchisement of voters, the voting itself, counting the votes, producing election returns, canvassing and tallying is still mostly done manually in a majority of countries. In each one of these stages, the 2,000-year-old system is unreliable at best and corrupt at worst. This leaves room for all kinds of problems. In many cases these problems are swept under the rug, but they pervert the ideal of democracy, that in elections it is only the will of the people that prevails.

Many people perceive the election process to be straightforward and take for granted that it works. For this reason, very little attention is given to election administration. But as one of the founders of Smartmatic, the largest voting technology company in the world, I can say that the election process is much more complex than most people realise. I am deeply concerned about the election process and consider the convergence of technology and politics a matter of great importance. I invite the reader to join me as I discuss this topic that is so fundamental to our democratic systems.

Election technology: the case for and against

After 11 years conducting thousands of elections on every continent, and working side by side with countless election professionals and volunteers, Smartmatic election specialists have discovered common themes in the challenges faced by those with the difficult jobs of organising, running and managing elections.

Read the FREE full article published in the June 2015 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Following the Arab spring, the power of social networks to drive social protest movements was acknowledged worldwide. Social networks, used mainly by young people, collected and crystallized their demands for change and also gave them the opportunity to get in touch with each other. 

However, the official regimes in these countries had to face new social demands and new technological challenges at once. And as we know, in many cases they didn`t succeed in this.

The Belarusian internet revolution started in June from the simple idea of trying to see the people who are ready to protest off line. Belarusian society, thoroughly entrenched in the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, has been suffering for the last 15 years under the grip of the state ideology. Relative economic stability, based on cheap Russian oil, was sufficient to keep ideological control over a large part of the voters. As for its ideology, the Belarusian regime, usually described by Western media as the “last dictatorship in Europe”, is also the last fortress of Soviet political values. The notorious official ideology of Belarus still characterises the country as part of non-existing Soviet state and constantly refers to the Soviets’ moments of glory, like the victory over fascism or the first space flight. In contrast to this artificially imposed, frozen ideological framework, the society is going through a difficult period of self-identification. The economic crisis was a trigger for another round of self questioning about the path that Belarus should take.

The state of play The group created in the Belarusian segment of the Russian replica of Facebook – VKontakte, known as “The Revolution through Social Networks”, called for the public to gather on the main squares of Belarusian cities at 19:00 each Wednesday. The first protest on 15 June was conceived as a manifestation of support for the car owners’ protest, which took place earlier that week. In order not to provoke the regime`s security forces it was decided not to perform any activities, but rather to have a “silent” protest. However, as the situation developed, protestors were inspired to choose their own very special way to express their disagreement: each time one of the participants was detained or harassed, people applauded. That was how the “silent” protests gained their “voice”. The number of participants grew rapidly. In Minsk there were 400 participants on the first Wednesday and 2,000 by the third Wednesday. In some of the cities these protests were the largest of any in the last 10 years.

As for virtual participation, the group on VKontakte has around 14.000 and is still growing. The movement also has Twitter and Facebook accounts. The way the protests were organised and the unexpected number of protestors were a real challenge for the Ministry of Interior. Being classical Soviet institutions, the Ministry of Interior and the KGB were not prepared both structurally and ideologically to even classify them. During the first protest they were desperately and unsuccessfully trying “to keep the order”. As for the virtual response to the protests, the KGB immediately used its ultimate cure, which it is using in response to all Internet “plagues”–blocking the web page of the group. There were some weak attempts to play on the same field as the protestors by creating accounts and by spamming the page with abusive content. However, the virtual revolutionists were vigilant and were publicly denouncing them. After have tried for a while to fight the virtual revolution with its own weapons, the Belarusian coercive structures resorted to their classical methods: arrests, intimidations and physical force. But not only the Belarusian regime was surprised by the success of the idea of the internet revolution. The Belarusian opposition was left out in the organization of the largest non-election protests. Being sceptical and divided in the beginning of the protests, the Belarusian democratic elites then changed their minds and tried to catch up at the last minute by signing an agreement of cooperation. The majority of the democratic parties and movements are supporting the protestors. Independence Day The Lukashenka regime is focusing its efforts to keep society under control by carrying out pseudo-patriotic events.

Lukashenka is appealing to Soviet history, and by distorting the facts, presents the Belarusian people, and particularly himself as the representative of Belarus, as the main contributors to the victory over fascism. Therefore, all dates connected to WWII are largely celebrated in the whole country. The last event of that kind was Independence Day on the 3r dof July in Minsk. Knowing the significance of this military parade to the ruling regime, the organisers of the internet-based group proposed gathering during the parade. The state security forces and the Ministry of Interior were vigilant, and everybody who was applauding “inconveniently” as well as others were detained directly on the parade stands. Other participants moved to the Railway stations’ square. There they were dispersed by special forces, with about 100 taken to temporary detention centres. Plainclothes agents acted violently toward women and teenagers and used tear gas against journalists. Many of the protestors were severely beaten. However, the next day, the organiser of the group stated that the protests will continue and the violent reaction of the authorities will only trigger more of them. …

Will it end in the same way as in North Africa? We will see on Twitter!