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The current situation in Libya presents both China and Russia with an opportunity to expand their influence in Africa and the Mediterranean. This exposes a weakness in the current policies of the European Union and NATO towards North Africa. While much of the focus has been, rightly, on Ukraine, neglecting other areas could prove just as damaging to NATO’s security interests. Russia and China are likely to continue to capitalise on NATO’s reluctance to engage in the region and the EU’s double standards in dealing with Libya – on the one hand engaging with Libya over reaching short-term solutions in various fields, particularly in terms of migration and, on the other hand, not engaging with the region in terms of long-term development. The lack of a strategy supporting Libyan unification (if this is even possible), stability, and reconstruction exposes a lack of foresight in addressing the situation in what is already a very volatile region. Ultimately, both entities may appear inconsistent in their approach.

An in-depth investigation by Radio France Internationale reveals a development which should be cause for concern in Europe. There has been an increase in Russian activity at the Al-Khadim airbase, located 100 km east of Benghazi.

The warning sign came when a large Russian Antonov-124, designed to carry up to 100 tonnes of cargo and operated by the 224 Flight Unit of the Russian Ministry of Defence, landed at Al-Khadim and continued its journey to other destinations, including Bamako in Mali and Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, before returning to Russia.

Located in a region under the control of General Khalifa Haftar, currently backed by Russia, Al-Khadim can prove to be pivotal for Russian operations in the Sahel region. This should be cause for concern both for NATO and the European Union. Russia also appears to be seeking to gain docking rights in either Tobruk or Benghazi, located approximately 600 km south of the Italian and Greek coasts.

While it has long been understood that Russia is a threat to Europe’s Eastern Flank, little attention is given to its potential to be a threat to Europe’s Southern Flank in the Mediterranean. A Russian presence in Libya could potentially pose a danger while shifting the balance of power considerably. It would enable Russia to achieve its long-held objective of having a warm-water port, thereby enhancing Moscow’s ability to influence regional dynamics and counter Western interests. Greater influence in Libya would also allow Russia easier access to specific critical resources, such as the much-vaunted Libyan oil fields. Increasing its influence on Libyan oil production and export can enable Russia to affect global energy markets while adding more pressure on Europe itself. Similarly, apart from undermining Europe, Russia’s backing of the Benghazi government places it in direct opposition to Turkey, which has also been supporting the UN-backed Tripoli government and which also seeks to increase its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Russian support for General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army is crucial to both sides. By backing Haftar, Russia is attempting to gain strategic leverage in eastern Libya while also positioning itself as a key player in resolving Libya’s political stalemate. Moreover, it also places Russia in a good position to secure several post-conflict projects and contracts. Haftar is also increasingly reliant on Russia, partially due to its ability to counter the Western and Turkish-backed Tripoli government. Haftar’s visit to Moscow in May 2025 has made many in Europe nervous about just how deeply Russia is involved in Libya.

Russian support entrenches, in the long run, a fragmented state of affairs, thus making political unification in Libya more difficult. Moreover, it frustrates attempts by both NATO and the EU to support the US-recognised Government of National Unity based in Tripoli. This, naturally, harms the possible stability of the Mediterranean since different interest groups try to gain influence in Libya due to its strategic position in terms of gaining access to other parts of Africa, most notably Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Sudan – areas characterised by military-led governments and active paramilitaries which undermine Western interests and strengthen Russia’s role as an alternative security partner.

It also comes at a time when the West has largely been disengaging from the area. NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya – though authorised by two UN Security Council Resolutions and not opposed by Russia – is widely perceived to have failed, given how events unfolded. Russia has capitalised on this, often accusing the West of using this intervention as a pretext for regime change. In its response, Russia is willing to engage with regional partners without insisting on democratic alignment. This can strengthen its hand in the region.

Similarly, China also seems to be making a return to Libya. Unlike Russia, China plays a delicate game, attempting to balance ties between the two rival Governments. China’s role is also more recent. Following visits to Beijing by Libyan officials in May and September 2024, including a high-profile visit by the Prime Minister of the UN-backed Government of National Unity, Abdul Hamid Al-Dbeibah, the Chinese government announced a strategic partnership between the two countries. So far, such relations have been based on meeting economic objectives and implementing reconstruction projects. However, it would be hard to rule out other dimensions of these relations. Libya remains strategically crucial due to its access to the rest of Africa. Moreover, China has demonstrated restraint, neutrality and balance between the two governments, which Russia has, so far, been lacking.

In light of this, several perspectives should be considered. Firstly, issues in Libya go beyond those related to migration. Secondly, the fragmented political situation in Libya has an impact that extends beyond its borders and is, therefore, also a security concern for Europe and the Mediterranean. The lack of a coherent policy in this regard should be of great concern. Thirdly, while Russia’s overtures in the region are concerning, its influence is not absolute, as there are various factions and interests at play in the area. There is, thus, some room for manoeuvre for both the EU and NATO.

André P. Debattista China EU-Russia Foreign Policy Mediterranean

On 24 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his troops to invade Ukraine. In the televised address he gave justifying his actions, Putin stated the “operation” had the purpose of protecting people facing humiliation and discrimination due to their Russian origins.

This rhetoric lies at the core of the concept of “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World). This worldview holds that Russia is not simply a state, but in fact the protector of Russian civilisation both at home and abroad. One can trace the roots of this idea to the post-Soviet era, when it was conceived as an ideological, political and geopolitical basis to legitimise Russia’s new domestic and foreign policy.

A bit further South, in Ankara, a similar and equally antagonistic concept which helps keep boundaries unclear was created by Turkish Navy officers and endorsed by Turkish elites and the wider public. “Mavi Vatan” (Blue Homeland) has, since 2019, become the spearhead of Turkish revisionism in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, mainly targeting Greece and Cyprus; and therefore, the European Union’s vital interests and security.

One could wonder what the connection is between these two doctrines. First and foremost, both consider Russia and Turkey respectively as the focal points of the international system, while defying their neighbours alongside any notion of international law. They take as fact that history treated Russia and Turkey unfairly and their borders should be re-examined. On that basis, Russia annexed Crimea in 2014; today, Erdoğan is taking aim at the 1923 Lausanne Treaty that defined Turkey’s modern borders. But the similarities do not end here; let’s run through a few of them.

Fear of encirclement: Both countries fear external enemies are trying to restrict them to their current borders. They also interpret the West as using proxy states such as Ukraine and Greece in order to complete their encirclement. It is difficult for the Kremlin and Aksaray to understand how smaller countries can act outside their sphere of influence. 

Imperial past and hegemonic ambitions: Moscow and Ankara perceive themselves as the heirs to an imperial past, which they contrast to their current status. Sovereign countries, formerly part of their respective empires, are only seen as territories of their vital space. They try to play a hegemonic role that almost always exceeds their actual military, economic and geopolitical strength.

Manipulation of religion: The Russian Orthodox Church has always been one of the most essential foreign policy tools for “Russkiy Mir”, particularly in the Balkans and neighbouring Slavic states. The Czarist dream of Moscow as the “Third Rome” is also a very convenient concept for Erdoğan’s regime, who would enjoy seeing the Ecumenical Patriarchate losing its historical influence among the global Orthodox community.

Similarly, Erdoğan’s attempt to present himself as the protector of all Muslims has found fertile ground in the Balkans and the Middle East, while it has garnered strong reactions from states such as Egypt, the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia.

Demilitarisation: Russia’s denial of Ukraine’s NATO perspective and a possible Western military presence was one of the reasons that led Moscow to attack Kyiv.

Similarly, Turkey alleges that the Eastern Greek islands should be demilitarised, otherwise, Greek sovereignty over the islands might be called into question. However, there is no connection between both issues in the Treaties (Lausanne 1923, Paris 1947). In addition, it is hard to see how a few islands with a population of 400.000 people pose any kind of threat to Turkey, a state which has invaded and occupied part of Cyprus since 1974, maintains one of the strongest formations of the Turkish Army (the second largest in NATO) immediately across Greece’s waters, has invoked an automatic “casus belli” against Greece if it exercises its sovereign rights in the Aegean and whose leadership recently unleashed direct military threats against an EU member.

Minorities/Human rights: Russkiy Mir perceives Russians as a territorially divided peoples which Russia should unite, making the protection of all Russian-speakers and their rights of utmost priority to the Russian state. This perception has been at the heart of Russia’s aggressive behaviour since 2008. Obviously, the widespread violation of human rights, discrimination against ethnic and other minorities, as well as the torture and prosecution of opposition figures through sham trials do not bother Russian leadership.

Similar trends have emerged in Turkey, especially after the failed coup d’état in 2016. Although Turkey condemns Greek authorities for allegedly mistreating the Muslim minority protected by the Lausanne Treaty, it is worth mentioning that Greek Muslims have doubled their numbers since 1923 while actively participating in the country’s political, economic and social life. Conversely, the Greeks of Istanbul, Gokceada/Imvros and Bozcaada/Tenedos (also protected by the Lausanne Treaty) have regularly fallen victim to prosecution and deportation, resulting in the reduction of their number from 200.000 a century ago to 3.000 today.

Hybrid war/Fake News: Both regimes have extensively used means of hybrid warfare and disinformation. From Russia’s interference in the 2016 US election and President Erdoğan’s “advice” to Turkish voters living in the Netherlands and Germany, to the weaponisation of refugees and immigrants in Evros (2020) and at the Belarus-Poland border (2021-2022), the aim never changes. To distort reality, and penetrate and destabilise neighbouring countries and the West.

Undoubtedly, both countries are very important for the stability of the international system and channels of communication should always remain open. However, it seems that especially in the case of Turkey, there has been a clear foreign policy shift. Hardly anyone believes Turkey is part of the Western security system anymore. Its Eurasian preference is evident in the statements not only of the government, but of the entire political class.

Europe and the West turned a blind eye to Russian aggression and revisionism for many years, with dreadful consequences; it would be catastrophic to allow this to happen once again in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

Panos Tasiopoulos EU-Russia Foreign Policy Greece Mediterranean

Famagusta was one of the most beautiful resorts in the Mediterranean Sea, attracting tourists from all over the world to its sun-kissed golden sand beaches. On the morning of 20 July 1974, this all changed. 40,000 heavily armed Turkish troops illegally landed at Kerynia and invaded northern Cyprus. On 14 August, Turkey launched its second offensive, under the code name “Attila II”, occupying Morphou, Famagusta, and Karpasia. Thousands of Greek Cypriots lost their lives, hundreds went missing, and 200,000 people were forced to abandon their homes. Since then, Famagusta, “the pearl of the East Mediterranean”, has become a ghost city.

Famagusta was much more than just a touristic resort. It was considered the cultural centre of Cyprus, while its Port attracted the largest business volume in the country, functioning as an important commercial hub until 1974.

Famagusta has a long and continuous history of 36 centuries, predominantly shaped by its Greek and Christian past. A large number of Christian refugees, fleeing the downfall of Acre (1291) in Palestine, transformed it from a tiny village into one of the richest cities in Christendom. In 1489, the Venetians made Famagusta the capital of Cyprus. The old walled and bastioned town contains some of the finest examples of medieval military architecture in existence. Famagusta fell to the Ottomans after a bitter and prolonged siege in 1570–71, followed by the British who ruled the island from 1878 to 1960, when Cyprus became independent. Under the British administration, a modern suburb called Varosha bloomed south of Famagusta, as a commercial centre and tourist resort.

During the Turkish invasion in 1974, the Turkish Air Force began bombing Famagusta and its troops approached Varosha. The inhabitants of the city were forced to flee their homes, with the hope that they would return when the situation became safer. However, the Turkish army violently seized control of the resort and illegally fenced off the area. Entry has since been forbidden, other than for Turkish military and United Nations personnel. Since then, it has been used by Ankara as a bargaining chip in talks to resolve the Cyprus issue. A UN resolution from 1984 called for the return of Varosha to UN control, and prohibits any attempt to resettle it by anyone other than those who were forced out, its legal inhabitants.

The United Nations has, in fact, set a very specific framework for the return of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants as early as 1979, through the High-Level Agreement between the then leaders of the two communities (Greek and Turkish). The resettlement of Varosha by its lawful inhabitants, under UN auspices, was set as a priority and “without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem”.

On 8 October 2020, following the announcement made two days prior, Turkey illegally and in violation of the relevant UNSC Resolutions, extended the license for entry to the coastal front of Varosha. This is a provocative action against not only the Republic of Cyprus, but against the EU, the UN, and any sense of human rights and international law. Subsequently, this development raised significant obstacles in the ongoing effort for a resumption of reunification talks. The “re-opening” of the fenced area of Varosha, under conditions of military occupation, reveals Ankara’s real intention to permanently divide Cyprus.

This intention was confirmed by Erdoğan himself. On 15 November 2020, the Turkish President, in an action of unprecedented provocation, “held a picnic” at Varosha, calling for a “two-state” solution in Cyprus, causing public outrage in Cyprus – even among Turkish Cypriots – and drawing condemnation from the international community.

Once again, Erdoğan is behaving like a bully. Turkey is further distancing itself from EU standards and values, not only by violating human rights and dignity within Turkey, but also by manipulating the crisis in Syria, weaponising refugees against the EU, openly threatening the territorial integrity of Greece and Cyprus, and fuelling the conflicts in Libya and the Caucasus. Finally, the Turkish President has proceeded with insulting remarks against EU leaders. Erdoğan’s regime follows anachronistic methods, a dangerous mix of venomous rhetoric and aggressive actions.

History has taught us that appeasement policy can sometimes lead to a greater threat of war. Turkey’s aggressivity is becoming bolder by the day. The time for words has passed.  The EU cannot shy away from its responsibilities. The European Parliament has paved the way for this with its latest resolution (11/2020), on Turkey’s recent illegal activities in the wider East Mediterranean. Now, it is the EU Council’s turn in December. We must re-define Europe’s strategy towards Turkey for the short, medium and long-term. Tough sanctions are the only way forward.

Lefteris Christoforou Margarita Kaimaklioti Foreign Policy Mediterranean

The rising terrorist threats in the region have compelled Morocco to enhance the protection of its vast territory, long borders, 34 million citizens and over 10 million visitors per year. Morocco’s comprehensive security strategy combines a wide range of policies which link the improvement of the socio-economic situation to the capacity to anticipate the risk of terrorism and the operational aspects of the strategy.

Security governance and the modernisation of the security forces, religious reform and the promotion of moderate Islam, the involvement of civil society, and close international cooperation, including religious diplomacy, are all key to preventing terrorism and countering extremism. Reforms to improve human security and to lift vulnerable groups out of poverty and exclusion have contributed to enhancing sustainable security.

An example for many, Morocco still has a few big challenges ahead, especially to provide quality education, both to ‘immunise’ the minds of the youth against extremism and to create jobs so that hope can be restored to an overwhelmingly young population.

Read the full article in the June 2017 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Assia Bensalah Alaoui Defence Mediterranean Neighbourhood Policy North Africa Security

The Libyan conflict is the result of a complex and controversial series of developments, where local political events have been strongly influenced and driven by exogenous factors. A dual set of conflicting interests can be found in both the Euro-Mediterranean and inter-Arab dimensions, with Italy and Turkey struggling against France and Great Britain on one side, and Qatar being opposed by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia on the other.

Muammar Qaddafi’s regime, which was certainly not an example of good governance and respect for human rights, was quickly swept away by a conflict primarily fought by non-Libyan actors, which eventually caused the collapse of the central institutions in Libya and the creation of dozens of local militias. The failure of both local and exogenous ambitions has caused a crisis in which additional factors have been able to influence the Libyan civil war, making the situation very opaque and extremely difficult to solve.

Read the full article in the June 2017 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Nicola Pedde Crisis Mediterranean North Africa Security

As Tunisia continues to move forward on the path of democratisation and pluralism, the problems it may still face remain significant. A comparative analysis of the (failed) Algerian attempt to democratise and the current process underway in Tunisia could shed light on what Tunisia needs to do to avoid a setback in its democratisation process.

Read the full article in the December 2016 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Dario Cristiani Arab Spring Democracy Foreign Policy Mediterranean North Africa

This article looks at how the Greek, German and British press have addressed the issue of the refugee crisis in Europe. Using a mixed research approach that combines corpus linguistics and discourse analysis, this article examines 1340 articles that were published online between 20 March and 31 May 2016 in Greece (Kathimerini, To vima), Germany (Die Welt, Süddeutsche Zeitung) and the UK (The Guardian, The Telegraph). The results presented by this article suggest that the press in all three countries mostly presented the refugee crisis in numbers. Geographical qualifiers were also deployed in the effort to broach this thorny issue, while the managerial aspect of the refugee crisis, the critical issue of child refugees and the EU–Turkey agreement were all among the most frequent topics covered by the press.

Read the full article in the December 2016 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Stergios Fotopoulos Crisis EU Member States Mediterranean Migration