As the international order fragments, confidence in the durability of democratic alliances is increasingly tested—not only by external adversaries, but by the capacity of democracies to withstand erosion from within. Western policymakers now debate the resilience of the transatlantic bond, the credibility of democratic partnerships, and whether liberal systems can absorb sustained pressure without hollowing out. Georgia offers one of the clearest—and most uncomfortable—answers. Not because it was weak, divided, or ambivalent about its place in the transatlantic community, but precisely because it was none of those things. Georgia had an unambiguous Western orientation, a record of democratic reform that once inspired its neighbours, and a proven willingness to absorb real political and security costs in pursuit of partnership with Europe and the United States. Yet over the course of a decade, it was allowed to slide back into Russia’s orbit through state capture, informal rule, and democratic hollowing—largely overlooked, persistently rationalised, and gradually normalised by Western governments and policy institutions entrusted with defending the rules-based order. This paper traces the mechanisms of Georgia’s democratic erosion, the failures of Western policy that enabled it, and the lessons this case holds for the future of transatlantic security and democratic resilience.