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The borderless European Union (EU) created by European integration is, in truth, still characterised by numerous borders of various kinds. Whilst EU Member States’ boundaries have undoubtedly changed their meaning and function, from lines of separation to bridges, national borders have de facto never disappeared.

To date, 40% of EU territory is constituted of border regions, i.e., sub-national entities located along or very close to land borders between Member States and/or EFTA countries. Moreover, almost 30% of the overall EU population resides in these areas, accounting for 30% of the EU’s GDP. One of the most tangible signs of cross-border relations is the number of cross-border commuters, which amounts to nearly 2 million. Although this data suggests that EU internal border regions cover an important portion of the Union’s territory and are actual living areas, these regions are often treated as peripheries by their respective states.

The border-bridging capacity of these territories is acknowledged, particularly by the European Commission, which defines them as living laboratories of EU integration and supports their demand for a new legal tool for cooperation. National authorities, however, are more reluctant to provide these regions with a new cooperation instrument under EU law. So, what is next for EU cross-border regions?

A failed attempt

The existing EU initiatives – like Interreg A and the tool “European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation” – have value on their own, yet they are not fit to overcome the legal and administrative obstacles resulting from differences in national laws and hampering cross-border cooperation in various sectors. For instance, conflicting rules on internships between The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany discourage Dutch students from doing an internship in neighbouring Germany or Belgium, because they would not be provided with health insurance, thereby making the cross-border labour market less attractive. To mention another example, the Portuguese urban centres of Elvas and Campo Maior and the Spanish one of Badajoz cannot develop a cross-border public transport system because their competencies in the sector stop at their national borders, making it impossible for them to arrange shared buses.

In 2015 a discussion at the EU level began about these so-called ‘cross-border obstacles’. As a result, the European Commission proposed a regulation on the European Cross-Border Mechanism (ECBM) in 2018, which was welcomed by the European Parliament. As originally foreseen by the Commission, the ECBM Regulation would have enabled “the application, within a given Member State and in relation to a common cross-border region, of the laws of a neighbouring Member State if the laws of the former were a legal obstacle to the delivery of a joint project”, as summarised by the EPRS.

However, national authorities suspended the negotiations on the ECBM in the Council, mainly due to concerns about territorial sovereignty, subsidiarity, and the legal basis of the instrument. Ironically, this decision was officialised in July 2021, i.e., in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic, which emphasised precisely the negative effects that the closures of national borders had on citizens living and working in these areas.

Widening the EU toolbox for cross-border cooperation

Although it is understandable that such a legal tool may raise some initial concerns, stopping its discussion only makes the list of cross-border obstacles longer. Another example comes from healthcare. In some places, the nearest hospital is the one located on the other side of the border. Setting up a cross-border ambulance service, however, requires complex agreements between states, which could be simplified precisely with a tool along the lines of the ECBM, as argued by MEP Pascal Arimont (EPP/BE). A mechanism, as stressed by MEP Herbert Dorfmann (EPP/IT), whose activation should remain voluntary to not undermine the sovereignty of Member States. 

Overall, cross-border obstacles showcase the need for a more polycentric Europe, especially in the field of territorial cooperation. We need an EU that does not cancel states’ territorial boundaries or national identities but prioritises people-based and place-based solutions. This would also go hand-in-hand with strengthening horizontal coordination between sub-state actors across state borders, thus reinforcing the EU multilevel governance system more broadly.

This vision would also allow Member States to prevent a political risk. Indeed, overlooking cross-border obstacles may lead to EU discontent and unattractiveness of the European project in EU borderlands. Conversely, cross-border regions must remain living laboratories of European integration.

Moreover, it was estimated that existing cross-border obstacles lead to a loss of 3% of total EU GDP and 8.8% of total GDP produced in land border regions, with a loss of employmentof over 6 million jobs. Addressing cross-border obstacles would yield some of the EU’s untapped economic potential.

A glimpse of hope for cross-border regions

Following the active role of the European Parliament in relaunching the ECBM, the Commission in December 2023 adopted an amended proposal for a Regulation on Facilitating Cross-Border Solutions. The proposal is said to preserve the original objective of resolving cross-border obstacles while taking into consideration the concerns and recommendations previously made by the European Parliament and the Council. The legislative procedure will therefore restart.

It remains to be seen whether the new proposed tool will address the unsolved questions. While the European Parliament’s support seems clear, it is now up to national authorities to end the centre-periphery cleavage and transform their border regions from peripheries of their states into the core of Europe. Fewer cross-border obstacles would also mean a more integrated and better-functioning EU.

Regional and local authorities already promote their own policies and actions in the international arena for humanitarian, political, commercial, cultural and institutional reasons. From cross-border to decentralised cooperation, under the concept of City diplomacy, local authorities often move independently and actively, both in the international arena and in the EU’s decision-making processes.

They act during conflicts, providing peace-building and dialogue opportunities, and take action in post-conflict regions or regions in need. This form of diplomacy complements traditional diplomacy and is mostly activated when the latter is frozen or required to remain low profile for contingent, political reasons. These new actors, with strong devolved powers at home and strong political leadership, deserve more attention from international players such as the European Commission and some of the United Nations’ agencies.

The current scheme of international cooperation is overly rigid. There is a need for more flexibility so that support—including financial support—can be better targeted to meet specific needs. This could lead to regional and local actors becoming direct recipients of international financial support for planning and running decentralised or bottom-up forms of cooperation, partnership and political dialogue.

Read the full article in the December 2016 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

An article dealing with the meaning of European federalism may appear untimely and anachronistic to many contemporary readers. It comes at a moment when the European ideal is under great strain, when only a handful of dreamers still have the temerity to call themselves ‘federalists’, and almost none of them would dare to do so in public. The EU has been mired for years in an economic crisis of unusual length and scope, the legitimacy of its institutions is being questioned and anti-EU forces are on the rise in many countries.

Besides, the claim to be offering a reappraisal of such an important topic may appear presumptuous, coming as it does after more than 60 years of European integration and many profound appraisals of this historical process.

However, very little systematic analysis has been carried out so far on the meaning of European federalism. This article, far from conclusive and all-encompassing, is a contribution in the direction of such an analysis. It reflects on the meaning of European federalism and argues that the values and policies it implies could offer answers to many contemporary challenges and change the EU and its member states for the better.

The first section deals with the ideals and institutional structure underpinning federalism. The second sketches the economic constitution of a federal polity. The third section briefly illustrates how this federalism can help meet certain contemporary challenges.

The meaning of federalism

Whereas the US founding fathers gathered in Philadelphia to draft the original constitution of the United States, the European founding fathers never fully articulated their political vision of an integrated Europe in a constitutional document. Therefore, the origins of European integration contain no grand federalising moment comparable to the US Constitutional Convention. European integration developed as a process for which ‘ever closer union’ and federalism were simply regulative ideals and not elements of a precise constitutional blueprint.

Today, a long way down the path of integration, this ambiguity seems less and less tenable, as it leaves all pro-Europeans open to the accusation that they are ultimately struggling to unify the continent within a state-like polity similar to those that unified the various European nations in previous centuries. 

Read the full FREE article published in the June 2015 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

The tenth anniversary of the EU enlargement to countries in Central and Eastern Europe offers an opportunity to take stock of the Visegrád Four, a grouping of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. What has EU membership meant for the Visegrád Four? Should the group have been dissolved when its members entered the EU, as some were suggesting at the time of accession?

In my opinion Visegrád cooperation has its justification even inside the EU. However, its potential remains unfulfilled.

The Visegrád Four has rarely functioned smoothly. The initial Czech boycott in the first half of the 1990s was followed by a paralysis caused by Mečiar’s authoritarian political regime in Slovakia up until 1998.

High-level disputes over the so-called Beneš decrees created rifts between Slovakia and Czechia on one hand, and Hungary on the other hand. Disagreement continues between Hungary and Slovakia regarding the Hungarian citizenship law that affects the Magyar minority in Slovakia.

In foreign policy each of the four countries, including Poland, pursue their narrow national interests even in situations where pulling together would be more effective.

Position in areas such as agricultural policy are far from unified and there is often precious little policy coordination even when it would be beneficial to all.

So is it all negative between the lands of Visegrád? Thankfully, there are positive developments, too.

A closer look reveals that membership in the EU is indeed providing a new raison d´être for the Four: the Visegrád countries do sometimes coordinate their positions in intergovernmental negotiations on different EU policy areas. Energy, defence and security are cases in point. The governments of the four countries have been working especially closely in these areas in response to the evolving Ukrainian crisis.

The group has also jointly supported democratisation processes in Eastern Europe and advocated further EU enlargements.

When it comes to economic policy, the members share the commitment to responsible public budgeting. They have, through joint efforts, made sure that the EU’s banking union will remain open to those countries which currently do not have the euro as their currency.

What is sometimes forgotten, is that the Four have succeeded in creating the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) to increase mutual trade. The CEFTA has succeed beyond expectations. Whilst its founder countries have left CEFTA on their entering the EU, this free trade area now includes now a number of countries in Western Balkans that aspire to the EU membership.

And separately from the national level, non-governmental organisations, churches, researchers, business and regional and municipal governments cooperate closely on a daily basis. To some extent, this is thanks to the government-funded International Visegrád Fund. Collaboration is stronger today than it was ten years ago.

Nevertheless, scope for improvement remains large. For example, the Visegrád Four could more forcefully advocate keeping the EU an open trading economy averse to government protectionism.

The degree of integration in the Visegrád Four is far less than, for example, integration between the three countries of the Benelux. A common parliamentary assembly, such as exists in the Benelux, is a distant dream. Also the Nordic Council could serve as a model of cooperation based on shared values.

It is up to enlightened politicians in Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Czechia to work together more constructively. Here is hoping that they will use the next ten years of EU membership to fulfil the potential of cooperation between the four countries.