Libya: A Shifting Balance of Powers?

The current situation in Libya presents both China and Russia with an opportunity to expand their influence in Africa and the Mediterranean. This exposes a weakness in the current policies of the European Union and NATO towards North Africa. While much of the focus has been, rightly, on Ukraine, neglecting other areas could prove just as damaging to NATO’s security interests. Russia and China are likely to continue to capitalise on NATO’s reluctance to engage in the region and the EU’s double standards in dealing with Libya – on the one hand engaging with Libya over reaching short-term solutions in various fields, particularly in terms of migration and, on the other hand, not engaging with the region in terms of long-term development. The lack of a strategy supporting Libyan unification (if this is even possible), stability, and reconstruction exposes a lack of foresight in addressing the situation in what is already a very volatile region. Ultimately, both entities may appear inconsistent in their approach.

An in-depth investigation by Radio France Internationale reveals a development which should be cause for concern in Europe. There has been an increase in Russian activity at the Al-Khadim airbase, located 100 km east of Benghazi.

The warning sign came when a large Russian Antonov-124, designed to carry up to 100 tonnes of cargo and operated by the 224 Flight Unit of the Russian Ministry of Defence, landed at Al-Khadim and continued its journey to other destinations, including Bamako in Mali and Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, before returning to Russia.

Located in a region under the control of General Khalifa Haftar, currently backed by Russia, Al-Khadim can prove to be pivotal for Russian operations in the Sahel region. This should be cause for concern both for NATO and the European Union. Russia also appears to be seeking to gain docking rights in either Tobruk or Benghazi, located approximately 600 km south of the Italian and Greek coasts.

While it has long been understood that Russia is a threat to Europe’s Eastern Flank, little attention is given to its potential to be a threat to Europe’s Southern Flank in the Mediterranean. A Russian presence in Libya could potentially pose a danger while shifting the balance of power considerably. It would enable Russia to achieve its long-held objective of having a warm-water port, thereby enhancing Moscow’s ability to influence regional dynamics and counter Western interests. Greater influence in Libya would also allow Russia easier access to specific critical resources, such as the much-vaunted Libyan oil fields. Increasing its influence on Libyan oil production and export can enable Russia to affect global energy markets while adding more pressure on Europe itself. Similarly, apart from undermining Europe, Russia’s backing of the Benghazi government places it in direct opposition to Turkey, which has also been supporting the UN-backed Tripoli government and which also seeks to increase its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Russian support for General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army is crucial to both sides. By backing Haftar, Russia is attempting to gain strategic leverage in eastern Libya while also positioning itself as a key player in resolving Libya’s political stalemate. Moreover, it also places Russia in a good position to secure several post-conflict projects and contracts. Haftar is also increasingly reliant on Russia, partially due to its ability to counter the Western and Turkish-backed Tripoli government. Haftar’s visit to Moscow in May 2025 has made many in Europe nervous about just how deeply Russia is involved in Libya.

Russian support entrenches, in the long run, a fragmented state of affairs, thus making political unification in Libya more difficult. Moreover, it frustrates attempts by both NATO and the EU to support the US-recognised Government of National Unity based in Tripoli. This, naturally, harms the possible stability of the Mediterranean since different interest groups try to gain influence in Libya due to its strategic position in terms of gaining access to other parts of Africa, most notably Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Sudan – areas characterised by military-led governments and active paramilitaries which undermine Western interests and strengthen Russia’s role as an alternative security partner.

It also comes at a time when the West has largely been disengaging from the area. NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya – though authorised by two UN Security Council Resolutions and not opposed by Russia – is widely perceived to have failed, given how events unfolded. Russia has capitalised on this, often accusing the West of using this intervention as a pretext for regime change. In its response, Russia is willing to engage with regional partners without insisting on democratic alignment. This can strengthen its hand in the region.

Similarly, China also seems to be making a return to Libya. Unlike Russia, China plays a delicate game, attempting to balance ties between the two rival Governments. China’s role is also more recent. Following visits to Beijing by Libyan officials in May and September 2024, including a high-profile visit by the Prime Minister of the UN-backed Government of National Unity, Abdul Hamid Al-Dbeibah, the Chinese government announced a strategic partnership between the two countries. So far, such relations have been based on meeting economic objectives and implementing reconstruction projects. However, it would be hard to rule out other dimensions of these relations. Libya remains strategically crucial due to its access to the rest of Africa. Moreover, China has demonstrated restraint, neutrality and balance between the two governments, which Russia has, so far, been lacking.

In light of this, several perspectives should be considered. Firstly, issues in Libya go beyond those related to migration. Secondly, the fragmented political situation in Libya has an impact that extends beyond its borders and is, therefore, also a security concern for Europe and the Mediterranean. The lack of a coherent policy in this regard should be of great concern. Thirdly, while Russia’s overtures in the region are concerning, its influence is not absolute, as there are various factions and interests at play in the area. There is, thus, some room for manoeuvre for both the EU and NATO.