This blog was initially published in Slovak by Denník N. You can find it here.

Many political leaders, analysts, and think tankers were reluctant to consider the possibility that Donald Trump could return to the White House. However, since Election Day, much ink has been spilled speculating over which European leader could win over the former and future President. This is merely to prevent the United States from abandoning the old, good, and lazy Europe. Some mention Starmer, others Meloni, and a third group has discovered Tusk. The most desperate look to Orbán. How should the European Union react?

First and foremost, I believe we need a systemic response. We should not be content with the old, tired argument of simply increasing defence spending as a percentage of GDP, as NATO members have been pressured to do. This demand, even during Trump’s first term, was problematic for Europeans. For one, not all EU members are in NATO, nor is Switzerland, nor are many associated countries. Moreover, simply increasing defence budgets doesn’t address many of the EU’s pressing defence issues: neglected production capacities for weapons and ammunition, individual procurement by member states driving up costs, a wide range of often incompatible weapons systems, inadequate transportation infrastructure (weak bridges, narrow roads, short runways), a lack of a comprehensive civil defence system, and the sensitive issue of military deterrence.

However, the unprecedented and ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine since February 2022, and the clear anti-Western and anti-democratic axis formed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, provide the strongest argument yet for a new approach to European and transatlantic security.

The question today is not primarily about how much money NATO members will spend on defence, but rather how this defence will be organised to be effective and sufficiently deterrent, and thus preventive. However, if necessary, it should also be operationally ready and capable of protecting European and transatlantic interests.

It’s crystal clear that the main challenge for the US is China, a country striving not only for hegemony in the South China Sea but also globally. The US expects the EU, along with the UK and other allies, to act as a ‘junior’ partner and ally in the effort to rein in the Chinese dragon. However, the US also expects the European Union and its European partners to play the role of a ‘senior’ partner in helping Ukraine defend itself. Can anyone reasonably object to such a distribution of responsibilities?

I see only one way to succeed in this global confrontation between authoritarian regimes and the West: to complete the process of European unification into a political union, the keystone of which will be the federalisation of the EU. This means protecting national competencies wherever member states can take on responsibilities themselves or where the principle of subsidiarity dictates. At the same time, this involves entrusting a final set of competencies to the Union at the federal level, in areas where member states cannot cope on their own, or where the Union’s institutions can ensure them more reliably and efficiently. Yes, I speak of foreign and security policy. In these areas, it is necessary to move away as soon as possible from lengthy negotiations towards effective decision-making, that is, voting. And this should be done in such a way that the voice of each member state is taken into account as much as possible.

The process of completing European unification requires suitable external circumstances, as well as a strong, dedicated leader. The circumstances have been ripe for a long time, and a leader is emerging: Friedrich Merz. Germany has developed into Europe’s great economic power since World War II. In recent decades, it has gained new, very valuable, both positive and negative, experiences and skills: with the acceptance of immigrants and their (non-)integration into its country, with the closure of nuclear power plants and its impact on Germany’s energy needs, with the enthusiasm for the Green Deal and its impact on German industry. Germany also has unique experience of the consequences of trying to befriend a bear… especially the Russian one. Germany is a federal country  where individual federal states have strong competencies and enjoy the respect and consideration of federal authorities.

International and domestic political circumstances are creating the right space for Europe’s traditional Franco-German engine to work again. Friedrich Merz, in particular, is a hope. The leader of the CDU is seasoned in both economic practice and politics. He knows not only the Bundestag but also the European Parliament. He has been a member of it. He knows the temptation of Eurocrats to take on what is not theirs. But he also knows the reality and the necessity of common, European action. The French President Emanuel Macron, on the other hand, has been in a tight spot between the extreme right and left since he called snap parliamentary elections. A breakthrough in promoting foreign policy and organising European defence could give him renewed energy and a chance to leave behind a worthy legacy.

It is often said that every challenge can also be seen as an opportunity. While this phrase may sometimes sound cliché, recent geopolitical shifts, particularly the ongoing crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, have given it new weight and significance. These challenges present a unique opportunity for us to re-evaluate our priorities and take decisive action. However, to fully capitalise on this opportunity, we must approach it with prudence, courage, and, most importantly, a sense of urgency.