The paper examines how Southeast European (SEE) countries navigate their relations with China within a rapidly changing international order. It highlights how domestic politics, regional dynamics, and global shifts influence these countries’ positions towards Beijing and alignment with the European Union (EU). While most SEE states maintain a formal commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration, their approaches to China reveal significant variations, ranging from pragmatic caution to active strategic alignment.
Using a comparative and longitudinal approach covering the period 2019–2025, the study analyzes how SEE countries align with Western positions in international fora, especially the United Nations (UN), how they respond to EU restrictive measures towards China, and how they engage in Chinese- led initiatives such as the Belt and Road and the China–CEE cooperation platform. It combines desk research, statistical analysis, and expert consultation to trace patterns of engagement and identify the domestic and strategic factors shaping these policies.
The findings show that SEE countries adopt divergent stances in multilateral settings. Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia generally align with Western-led initiatives critical of China, while Serbia consistently sides with Beijing and Greece remains cautious or abstains. The gradual decline in SEE participation in UN statements condemning China since 2024 reflects not a policy reversal but a period of tactical restraint, shaped by electoral cycles, economic uncertainty, and the evolving US-China competition. Similarly, while EU members and candidate countries such as Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia maintain full alignment with the EU’s China-related policies, Serbia resists restrictive measures and cultivates a “special relationship” with Beijing. Since 2019, participation of Southeast European countries in the Belt and Road Navigating Multipolarity: Southeast Europe in the EU’s China Strategy Initiative and the China–CEE cooperation platform has steadily declined, with most governments reducing engagement to symbolic levels to avoid antagonizing Beijing while maintaining Euro-Atlantic commitments.
Economic engagement remains the main driver of relations. Across the region, trade with China is asymmetric, dominated by imports of industrial and technological goods and limited exports of raw materials. Serbia and Greece host the most substantial Chinese investments in sectors such as energy, mining, and transport, while elsewhere Chinese financing remains modest. The region’s experience with large-scale infrastructure projects illustrates both opportunity and vulnerability: when conducted within transparent EU frameworks, as in Croatia’s Pelješac Bridge, outcomes can be positive, whereas projects financed through opaque bilateral loans, as in Montenegro or Serbia, have raised concerns over debt, governance, and environmental standards.
Beyond economics, China’s soft-power presence varies widely. In Serbia and parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, media cooperation and elite-level ties amplify pro-China narratives, while in most other SEE states public opinion remains neutral or firmly pro-Western. Beijing’s influence in Bulgaria or North Macedonia operates mainly through local partnerships in academia, municipalities, and media. In EU membership hopefuls with limited accession prospects, it fills the space left by limited EU engagement. These dynamics reveal both the adaptability of China’s approach and the uneven resilience of SEE societies to external influence.
Overall, the analysis suggests that SEE countries’ positioning towards China is shaped less by ideology than by pragmatic balancing. Domestic politics, strategic dependencies, and perceptions of economic opportunity determine the scope of engagement. Serbia stands out as the only country to align politically with Beijing, while most others pursue cautious cooperation under the constraints of Euro-Atlantic commitments.
For the EU, the region represents both a vulnerability and an opportunity. The fragmented approach of SEE countries highlights the limits of Europe’s coherence on China, yet their consistent alignment with EU policy in most cases shows potential for strengthening Europe’s collective stance. The study concludes that a more inclusive EU policy that systematically integrates SEE perspectives, accelerates enlargement, and offers credible economic alternatives would enhance Europe’s strategic resilience and its capacity to navigate an increasingly multipolar world.
