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The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) released in December 2025 sent shock waves through Europe’s capitals. For many observers, the document marks the real “Zeitenwende” in transatlantic relations, shattering decades of an Atlantic community based on common values and interests. Most commentators have focused on the tectonic implications for the European security architecture, or the blatant interference in European domestic politics. Yet, the indirect ramifications for Europe’s broader global role, including in the Indo-Pacific, a global powerhouse, have received less attention. As shown by the brazen American intervention in Caracas, when President Maduro was seized by an American commando to be brought to the United States to stand trial, the United States’ new foreign policy doctrine is neither selective nor geographically bounded. The question for Europe is therefore, what does the NSS mean for Europe’s ties with China – and Taiwan?

Facing the Uncertainty

The first months of the Trump II administration saw a heated debate on whether the United States would remain committed to defending the integrity of Taiwan by continuing to contribute to its capacity to withstand the growing existential threat from the PRC. The NSS highlights Taiwan’s strategic importance as the cornerstone of US hegemony over the Western Pacific: “Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theatres”.

The document emphasises that “deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority”. It also commits to “not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait”, a slightly different (and softer) language compared to previously used “oppose[s]” any such unilateral change.

The fact that while the NSS appears to deprioritise the Indo-Pacific while broadly maintaining continuity with past policy on Taiwan may be at once reassuring and worrying to both America’s closest allies in the region, as well as to Europe. One key question must therefore be asked: is this approach truly just a continuation of past administrations? What other, more fundamental changes in America’s foreign relations must Europe consider?

America First

The core message of the NSS is clear: “In everything we do, we are putting America First”. In other words, expect a US foreign policy that is no longer about seeking global leadership, or even promoting democratic values and a rule-based order. “The purpose of foreign policy is the protection of core national interests; that is the sole focus of this strategy.” Europe must adjust to this posture, not only in its transatlantic relationship, but concerning other major powers – and given its global weight and influence, China is the most relevant one.

The situation in Venezuela only reinforces this reality; the United States now firmly believes its best strategy is unilateralism and prioritising transactional bargaining with foreign actors, disregarding any commitment to established processes and multilateral cooperation and its associated legitimacy.

While the NSS is right about shared concerns of Western democracies about the lack of a level-playing field in trade relations with China, the US and Europe are unlikely to converge on how to manage China. Considering Trump’s clear penchant to a transactional and unilateral posture reiterated in the NSS, Europe must have its own China policy. This must be guided by its own interests. It must also rely on a robust, agile toolbox to boost the bloc’s competitiveness, and pursue coordination with like-minded partners that align with its interests and values. 

For long, EU member states have failed to converge on a realistic and effective China policy to ensure the bloc has leverage, commensurate with its collective economic weight. The likelihood of alignment across the bloc remains low. The good news is that there is shared agreement that things must change. China’s continuous support to Russia, waging aggression in the heart of Europe, has accelerated efforts to reconsider the way the EU works. The bad news is that time is not on the EU’s side, and transatlantic relations are no longer what they used to be.

As the NSS suggests, for Washington under Trump, dialogue doesn’t matter. For Europe however, dialogue is paramount in everything it does. Europe must therefore choose a different approach, one that ensures maintaining open channels of communication with China. But at the same time Europe must be clear, firm, and strategic about what it wants from China whenever dialogue takes place.  

Our belief in dialogue is also what sets us apart from Washington’s unpredictable and unreliable handling of international affairs. It is in Europe’s interest to position itself as a reliable partner to the Indo-Pacific – and Taiwan.

The European Union must adopt an assertive, clear, and consistent approach to Taiwan. Given its geostrategic importance to Europe’s security and prosperity, a consistent stance on Taiwan must be part of Europe’s strategic calculations going forward. As developments of recent years have made it clear, Taiwan is no longer merely an appendix to our China policy. It must remain anchored in an effective Indo-Pacific strategy of our own. To continue on this path, the EU must double down on its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, Korea, India, and countries in Southeast Asia (ASEAN).

At the same time, wherever possible and desirable, the EU must remain open to transatlantic coordination on China. The EU must invest in its ability to decide for itself, to be able to avoid pressure from Washington.

Conclusion

Ironically, the NSS claims that the US continues to be “the global partner of first choice”. Our take is: Europe is in a better position to be a trustworthy and reliable partner of choice for countries in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, including Taiwan, a democratic stronghold in the Western Pacific with a critical role in global supply chains. Additionally, we are now painfully aware that the US will not shy away from applying pressure where it sees fit in order to reach its goals. In other words, Europe has what it takes to become a relevant geopolitical actor amid global disruptions, but it must first learn to use its collective weight, rebuild its credibility vis-à-vis its partners, and deliver in line with partner countries’ needs.

Peter Hefele Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy Asia Foreign Policy US