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On 8 February, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi secured a two-thirds supermajority in a key parliamentary election. The outcome – 316 seats out of 465 in the Parliament’s Lower House – marks the best result for her party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since its founding in 1955. Together with its coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the bloc won 352 seats, while the main opposition Centrist Reform Alliance held on to only 49 of the 172 seats it previously held. The result is clear: Takaichi has consolidated her position, and this will likely influence the strategic reality of the Indo-Pacific region.

In a televised interview, Takaichi promised to pursue policies designed to make Japan strong and prosperous. Japan’s neighbours have largely embraced her victory – except for China. How Takaichi manages relations with China will define her foreign and security policy agenda, and shape Japan’s relations with like-minded partners in the region and beyond, most of whom share closely aligned economic and security interests with Tokyo. Given the Indo-Pacific region’s strategic relevance to Europe’s security and prosperity, sustained European engagement in the region will therefore be essential.

The leaders of South Korea, India, and Taiwan all took to social media as the landslide became clear to congratulate Takaichi and express their eagerness for future cooperation between their countries and Takaichi’s Japan. Predictably, Beijing offered neither praise, nor diplomatic restraint. In line with China’s firmness on the principle of non-interference, Foreign Minister Spokesperson Lin Jian said the elections were “the internal affair of Japan”. He then urged Japan to “follow the path of peaceful development rather than return to militarism”. Spokesperson Lin didn’t miss the chance to “once again urge Japan to retract the erroneous remarks of Sanae Takaichi on Taiwan and take the concrete actions to demonstrate the necessary sincerity to uphold the political foundation of China-Japan relations”.

This hostile tone comes from the diplomatic spat in Japan-China relations following Takaichi’s remarks on November 7, 2025. While responding to questions during a meeting in the Lower House of Japan’s Diet, Prime Minister Takaichi said that China’s use of military force against Taiwan – such as a naval blockade – would likely constitute a “survival-threatening situation” that would force Japan to respond. To clarify what she meant by such a situation, she added: “A judgement must be made after comprehensively assessing all information in line with the individual and specific circumstance of what has actually occurred”.

For Beijing, Taiwan is a core national interest, and it therefore considers Takaichi’s statement an interference in China’s domestic affairs. China responded with measures such as restrictions on Japanese seafood imports and summoning the Japanese ambassador. Takaichi has not retracted her remarks. Instead, she insisted her position was in line with existing policy.

In recent years and directly linked to Beijing’s hostility, Japan has proved to be a quiet but consistent and reliable partner for Taiwan. Both East Asian nations have repeatedly found themselves at the receiving end of Beijing’s economic coercion. Strengthened from the top through parliamentary diplomacy and reinforced from the ground up by cultural affinity and shared democratic values, Japan and Taiwan are increasingly bound by a shared concern over regional security.

The “Freedom pineapples” social media campaign, sparked by China’s 2021 ban on Taiwanese pineapple imports and met by Japan’s quick move to buy large quantities of the fruit, stands as a clear testament to the depth of this friendship. At the time, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (who had mentored Takaichi when she entered politics) shared a picture of himself on social media holding a pineapple, which gained over half a million likes in just five hours. The post said: “Today’s snack is pineapples, and they look delicious”.

Beyond solidarity, Japan and Taiwan share a highly complementary relationship in critical technologies, particularly semiconductors; Taiwan leads in advanced manufacturing and Japan excels in equipment. Finally, they both depend on maritime routes for their imports and remain dependent on foreign countries for their energy needs, a critical vulnerability amid escalating fragmentation. In fact, it is in the Indo-Pacific that geopolitical instability has played out most acutely.

As the world’s economic centre of gravity, the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific is highly contested, shaped by the US-China strategic rivalry and an assertive China, and not least by the response of regional states to the growing rivalry. Escalating tensions are forcing regional states to exercise agency, moving beyond being mere pawns in great power competition.

For Indo-Pacific regional powers, living simultaneously in two different realities—an economic reality of deep integration with China, and a political-security reality of maintaining a vital security partnership with the US—has required careful balancing and constant hedging. Southeast Asian nations have used diplomacy to navigate great power rivalry under the umbrella of ‘ASEAN Centrality’, choosing flexibility, rather than sides. Japan and Korea are both realigning their strategies in line with their interests.

Notwithstanding the growing difficulty of balancing, Indo-Pacific countries have found a way to avoid alignment. Takaichi’s victory seems to solidify this trend, which directly aligns with European interests. Japan is likely to continue to assert itself along its interests, invest in resilience to hedge against uncertainty, and stay open to cooperation. Japan and Taiwan have overlapping interests in economic security and maritime security and believe in the value of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

This belief also aligns closely with Europe’s own strategic interests and enduring emphasis on dialogue and cooperation, as it seeks to keep up with fierce global competition. As such, cultivating deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific – particularly in critical technologies and resilient supply chains with partners such as Japan and Taiwan – is essential to its own ability to forge and shape effective strategic partnerships in the region. Japan and Taiwan will remain indispensable to Europe’s supply chain restructuring and technological sovereignty efforts.

Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy Asia Elections Foreign Policy

The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) released in December 2025 sent shock waves through Europe’s capitals. For many observers, the document marks the real “Zeitenwende” in transatlantic relations, shattering decades of an Atlantic community based on common values and interests. Most commentators have focused on the tectonic implications for the European security architecture, or the blatant interference in European domestic politics. Yet, the indirect ramifications for Europe’s broader global role, including in the Indo-Pacific, a global powerhouse, have received less attention. As shown by the brazen American intervention in Caracas, when President Maduro was seized by an American commando to be brought to the United States to stand trial, the United States’ new foreign policy doctrine is neither selective nor geographically bounded. The question for Europe is therefore, what does the NSS mean for Europe’s ties with China – and Taiwan?

Facing the Uncertainty

The first months of the Trump II administration saw a heated debate on whether the United States would remain committed to defending the integrity of Taiwan by continuing to contribute to its capacity to withstand the growing existential threat from the PRC. The NSS highlights Taiwan’s strategic importance as the cornerstone of US hegemony over the Western Pacific: “Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theatres”.

The document emphasises that “deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority”. It also commits to “not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait”, a slightly different (and softer) language compared to previously used “oppose[s]” any such unilateral change.

The fact that while the NSS appears to deprioritise the Indo-Pacific while broadly maintaining continuity with past policy on Taiwan may be at once reassuring and worrying to both America’s closest allies in the region, as well as to Europe. One key question must therefore be asked: is this approach truly just a continuation of past administrations? What other, more fundamental changes in America’s foreign relations must Europe consider?

America First

The core message of the NSS is clear: “In everything we do, we are putting America First”. In other words, expect a US foreign policy that is no longer about seeking global leadership, or even promoting democratic values and a rule-based order. “The purpose of foreign policy is the protection of core national interests; that is the sole focus of this strategy.” Europe must adjust to this posture, not only in its transatlantic relationship, but concerning other major powers – and given its global weight and influence, China is the most relevant one.

The situation in Venezuela only reinforces this reality; the United States now firmly believes its best strategy is unilateralism and prioritising transactional bargaining with foreign actors, disregarding any commitment to established processes and multilateral cooperation and its associated legitimacy.

While the NSS is right about shared concerns of Western democracies about the lack of a level-playing field in trade relations with China, the US and Europe are unlikely to converge on how to manage China. Considering Trump’s clear penchant to a transactional and unilateral posture reiterated in the NSS, Europe must have its own China policy. This must be guided by its own interests. It must also rely on a robust, agile toolbox to boost the bloc’s competitiveness, and pursue coordination with like-minded partners that align with its interests and values. 

For long, EU member states have failed to converge on a realistic and effective China policy to ensure the bloc has leverage, commensurate with its collective economic weight. The likelihood of alignment across the bloc remains low. The good news is that there is shared agreement that things must change. China’s continuous support to Russia, waging aggression in the heart of Europe, has accelerated efforts to reconsider the way the EU works. The bad news is that time is not on the EU’s side, and transatlantic relations are no longer what they used to be.

As the NSS suggests, for Washington under Trump, dialogue doesn’t matter. For Europe however, dialogue is paramount in everything it does. Europe must therefore choose a different approach, one that ensures maintaining open channels of communication with China. But at the same time Europe must be clear, firm, and strategic about what it wants from China whenever dialogue takes place.  

Our belief in dialogue is also what sets us apart from Washington’s unpredictable and unreliable handling of international affairs. It is in Europe’s interest to position itself as a reliable partner to the Indo-Pacific – and Taiwan.

The European Union must adopt an assertive, clear, and consistent approach to Taiwan. Given its geostrategic importance to Europe’s security and prosperity, a consistent stance on Taiwan must be part of Europe’s strategic calculations going forward. As developments of recent years have made it clear, Taiwan is no longer merely an appendix to our China policy. It must remain anchored in an effective Indo-Pacific strategy of our own. To continue on this path, the EU must double down on its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, Korea, India, and countries in Southeast Asia (ASEAN).

At the same time, wherever possible and desirable, the EU must remain open to transatlantic coordination on China. The EU must invest in its ability to decide for itself, to be able to avoid pressure from Washington.

Conclusion

Ironically, the NSS claims that the US continues to be “the global partner of first choice”. Our take is: Europe is in a better position to be a trustworthy and reliable partner of choice for countries in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, including Taiwan, a democratic stronghold in the Western Pacific with a critical role in global supply chains. Additionally, we are now painfully aware that the US will not shy away from applying pressure where it sees fit in order to reach its goals. In other words, Europe has what it takes to become a relevant geopolitical actor amid global disruptions, but it must first learn to use its collective weight, rebuild its credibility vis-à-vis its partners, and deliver in line with partner countries’ needs.

Peter Hefele Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy Asia Foreign Policy US