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Europe has experienced a significant slowdown in both economic and productivity growth since the early 2000s, causing the average European today to earn approximately 34% less than their American counterpart, with 70% of this income gap driven by lower productivity levels. For years, Europe has failed to take advantage of the digital revolution, which is why only four European technology firms are among the fifty biggest worldwide. These structural weaknesses are compounded by rising geoeconomic exposure. China, for instance, currently supplies nearly 100 percent of the heavy rare earth elements critical to clean energy and advanced manufacturing technologies.
The Latin American economy, for its part, has experienced minimal economic growth over the past decades. Between 2014 and 2023, the region’s gross domestic product grew at a mere 0.9%. Latin America remains the world’s most unequal region in terms of income distribution, with a persistently high poverty rate of 27%. Governance failures and extensive state intervention in the economy have hindered the region’s economic performance. Latin America’s market composition lacks the human and financial capital needed for higher growth rates. Weak property rights protections, judicial systems and infrastructure are also present throughout the region.
Europe and Latin America represent complementary reflections of each other’s economic strengths and structural needs. Europe generates surplus capital and hosts globally competitive export firms, yet its growth remains constrained by regulatory burdens, internal market fragmentation, and sluggish domestic consumption. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), in contrast, form a market of over 650 million people characterised by persistent unmet consumer and industrial needs and considerable untapped export potential. This complementarity has become strategically critical as Europe seeks to reduce dependency on Chinese supply chains. This is particularly true in the energy sector, given Latin America’s possession of nearly 40% of global copper production and significant reserves of nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements.
As the European Union and the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) move toward ratifying their comprehensive partnership agreement, they face a strategic choice: whether EU–Latin America relations become a pillar of Europe’s competitiveness and economic security, or whether that space is ceded to competitors like China. This report is framed around that decision. It sets out what is concretely at stake for both sides, identifies the binding economic constraints shaping EU and LAC performance, and pinpoints their highest-value opportunities in terms of economic growth and security. It then advances a focused set of politically realistic policy actions capable of delivering measurable economic gains.
Economy Latin America Trade Transatlantic
Europe and Latin America: A Solution to Each Others’ Economic Challenges
Other
31 Aug 2026
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On January 3, 2026, the United States carried out major strikes in the Venezuelan capital of Caracas and its vicinity, before capturing the country’s illegitimate ruler, Nicolás Maduro, and flying him to the United States to face federal criminal charges, including narco-terrorism and drug trafficking. Following his capture, Venezuela’s Vice-President, Delcy Rodríguez, was sworn in as acting President.
The vast majority of Venezuelans supported the American operation, after 12 years of a brutal Maduro regime. During his tenure, Venezuela lost roughly 70% of its GDP, reducing 80% of its population to poverty, with 50% of those suffering from extreme poverty. Thousands of companies and farms were expropriated. Those that survived were suffocated by price controls, currency controls, production quotas, and arbitrary enforcement. The Venezuelan economic crisis since 2013 is considered the worst economic performance of any country in the modern times in the absence of a war.
In addition to this stunning economic collapse, Venezuela suffered a profound political breakdown. Under Maduro’s rule, elections were consistently stolen and manipulated to maintain power rather than reflect the will of the people. The last example of this was in the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election, when the National Electoral Council declared Maduro the winner despite credible evidence that his opponent, Edmundo Gonzalez, secured a clear majority. Since the 2000s, the Venezuelan regime stacked the courts with loyalists, disqualified opposition leaders, jailed critics, and violently suppressed protestors.
However, any exultation from Venezuela’s people must be tempered by the fact that this operation is just the beginning; the decisions taken in the coming days will determine Venezuela’s future. The real test now is whether the country can translate the removal of a dictator into the restoration of the rule of law, credible governance, and economic freedom, without allowing a power vacuum to generate further instability.
Building a Transition Path
Building a successful transition depends on sound decisions across institutions, but none of these decisions can take root without effective security on the ground. Venezuela today remains an extremely high-risk environment. Irregular armed groups, drug trafficking networks, organised crime, and foreign hostile actors, including Iranian-linked cells, operate with relative impunity across large parts of the country. Without credible protection against these actors, there can be neither sustained economic recovery nor free and fair elections. Markets cannot function, investment cannot flow, and democratic processes cannot be trusted when violence, intimidation, and sabotage remain unchecked.
Security mechanisms must therefore prioritise the protection of civilians, but also of the people tasked with rebuilding the Venezuelan state. This includes technical experts, energy specialists, public administrators, and investors who will necessarily need to operate on the ground, many of whom will come from abroad. If these individuals face credible threats to their safety, the reconstruction of the oil sector, public institutions, and the broader economy will simply not occur. This is why a sustainable transition requires a structured partnership between the United States, a legitimate transitional government, and Venezuelan society itself.
Once a baseline of security is re-established, Venezuela must move immediately to economic normalisation. This means lifting price and currency controls, gradually unifying exchange rates, restoring basic monetary credibility, and reopening trade and investment flows with democratic partners. The energy sector must be opened to private investment, so that Venezuela can become an energy hub once again. In the past two decades, Venezuela has lost over 70% of its oil production. From producing 3.5 million barrels per day, Venezuela is now producing less than a million. Returning to its previous levels will require $60 billion in investment and roughly a decade.
In this context, the European Union can emerge as a particularly credible and economically rational partner for Venezuela’s recovery. Europe combines three assets that are directly aligned with Venezuela’s post-crisis needs: surplus capital, advanced industrial and energy technology, and a growing strategic imperative to diversify away from Chinese-controlled supply chains. The European economy runs a persistent current account surplus and faces structurally weak domestic investment demand, creating strong incentives to deploy capital abroad in projects with long time horizons and real asset backing. Venezuela, by contrast, offers a rare combination of scale and underutilisation. It has the largest proven oil reserves in the world, substantial natural gas potential, and an energy system in need of comprehensive rehabilitation.
From a political perspective, Europe should participate in Venezuela’s transition efforts. Yes, the risks are real. Venezuela is fragile, its institutions are weak, and criminal structures remain embedded in the state. But there is no reward without risk, and risk aversion is not a policy. In Venezuela, every peaceful option was tried and exhausted. Years of mass protests. Repeated participation in elections that were systematically manipulated. Diplomatic pressure, mediation efforts, and sanctions. None of it worked. The regime adapted, hardened, and increased repression. Standing with Venezuelans will not be cost‑free, but it is the only choice worthy of Europe’s values and interests. If European governments commit to this difficult transition alongside Venezuelan society, a country that once stood as a democratic and economic beacon in Latin America can be restored. A stable, free Venezuela will matter not only to its own citizens, but to the wider geopolitical balance and global security architecture of the coming decades.
Jorge Jraissati Economy Foreign Policy Latin America

Jorge Jraissati
Venezuela Post-Maduro: Meeting the Challenge of Reconstruction
Blog
12 Jan 2026

