Related posts

Donald Trump’s renewed push for a peace deal with Vladimir Putin is sending shockwaves far beyond Ukraine. While the talks focus on a possible settlement of the war, their ripple effects are already being felt in other contested regions – most notably the South Caucasus. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia sit at the crossroads of Russian, Western, Turkish, and, increasingly, Chinese influence. By signalling a willingness to compromise with Moscow, Trump’s diplomacy risks recalibrating this fragile balance of power, with consequences the region cannot ignore.

As a corridor for energy, trade, and connectivity between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, the South Caucasus is highly sensitive to changes in US-Russia relations. Any recalibration between Washington and Moscow affects external support, regional alliances, and even domestic stability. For leaders in Yerevan, Baku, and Tbilisi, it is not only the outcome but also the conduct of negotiations that is already reshaping their strategic calculations.

Russia’s Enduring Leverage – But No Longer Absolute

For Moscow, the South Caucasus has always been a “traditional sphere of influence,” exercised through three levers: military presence, energy dependency, and security arrangements.

Yet in the episode of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement over Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia’s grip has weakened. The withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers reshaped Moscow’s role as mediator and security guarantor. Russian dominance over energy and transport corridors has also eroded as Baku expanded gas exports to Europe and developed new infrastructure that bypasses Russian-controlled routes.

Still, Russia retains substantial influence. In Armenia, Moscow operates its military base in Gyumri and stations FSB Border Guards along the country’s frontiers. Armenia’s energy sector is entirely dominated by Russia: Gazprom owns 100% of Armgazprom, while the Metsamor nuclear plant remains reliant on Russian technology and expertise.

In Georgia, Russia exerts even more direct leverage through its occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where some 10,000 troops, supported by naval and air assets, serve as a constant reminder of Kremlin power. Adding to this, Tbilisi’s increasingly pro-Russian orientation under the Georgian Dream government – marked by its retreat from Euro-Atlantic aspirations, curbing of Western integration, and growing economic and diplomatic alignment with Moscow – has deepened Russia’s political influence over Georgia.

America Steps In

The erosion of Russia’s monopoly has created space for the United States. Under President Trump, Washington brokered a historic peace declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan in August 2025, marking a breakthrough after decades of conflict. The agreement unlocked strategic transit routes – most notably the Zangezur corridor – and granted exclusive American development rights for 99 years. For the first time in years, Washington could re-emerge as a key player in the South Caucasus, also by supporting economic diversification through the Middle Corridor, which bypasses Russia and Iran while advancing US and European energy interests. Yet such a role requires sustained commitment, while Trump’s engagement remains transactional rather than strategic, casting doubt on the durability of US involvement.

Regional leaders interpret this shift differently. Armenia sees US mediation as a potential counterweight to Moscow but knows Russia’s military presence still constrains its autonomy. Georgia’s ruling elite view Trump’s pragmatism as a green light to entrench their Russia-friendly trajectory. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, uses US involvement to boost its leverage, while continuing to cultivate ties with Turkey, Israel, NATO, and the EU.

China’s Advance

The South Caucasus is no longer just a chessboard for Washington and Moscow. China has steadily expanded its role through the Belt and Road Initiative, focusing on the “Middle Corridor” that links Asia and Europe while bypassing Russia and Iran. Beijing has invested in transit and energy projects across Georgia and Azerbaijan, seeking access to Black Sea and Caspian routes.

At the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, held on 31 August, China showcased its ambition by convening leaders including Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. For Armenia, this raises difficult questions: remain tied to Russian-led structures like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), or explore alternatives with the EU and China? Beijing’s appeal lies in its image as a pragmatic partner, free of ideological baggage.

For now, China’s role remains secondary, but its gradual expansion risks further diluting EU influence in the region.

Regional Perspectives: Hedging and Its Risks

Trump’s negotiations with Putin sharpen the central dilemma facing the South Caucasus: stability versus autonomy. If the talks produce a deal that re-legitimises Russia, Moscow will be emboldened to exert renewed pressure on Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan to accommodate Kremlin interests. If, on the other hand, Russia emerges weakened or constrained, its ability to dominate the region will diminish – but instability could persist, creating new openings for other actors.

From the perspective of South Caucasus leaders, this uncertainty leaves little room to rely on a single great power. The shifting US stance is seen as proof that alliances are never permanent, reinforcing the perceived need for multivectoral diplomacy – maintaining channels with Washington, Brussels, Moscow, Beijing, and Ankara alike. For some, this creates space to hedge and balance; for others, it can be a convenient way to re-engage with Russia under the cover of diversification.

The dangers of renewed dependence on Russia are stark. Moscow has a long record of weaponising energy prices, military deployments, and unresolved conflicts to bend its neighbours to its will. What is presented as “stability” often masks coercion: discounted gas in exchange for political loyalty, security guarantees that vanish in moments of crisis, and frozen conflicts deliberately kept alive to limit sovereignty. For the South Caucasus, reliance on Russia has never meant protection – it has meant vulnerability, paralysis, and the erosion of genuine independence.

This is precisely why the EU must act. It should anchor itself as a long-term actor in the South Caucasus. This requires more than funding or monitoring missions: it means reinforcing its mediation role in the aftermath of the Armenia–Azerbaijan deal, helping to secure border demarcation, normalisation, and reconciliation so that peace is not left to Moscow or Washington alone. At the same time, Brussels must embed itself in the region’s future through connectivity and energy projects that link the South Caucasus more closely to Europe. Coordinating with Turkey on transit and security, and advancing joint initiatives with the South Caucasus countries on the Middle Corridor, would extend Europe’s reach into Central Asia while reducing the leverage of Russia and Iran. Dedicated instruments for infrastructure, renewables, and digital connectivity would give the EU tangible weight, while conditional and progress-linked support could encourage reforms in Armenia and Georgia. Ultimately, only by combining mediation, economic investment, and strategic partnerships can the EU prevent “multivectoral diplomacy” from sliding back into renewed dependence on Moscow and instead turn it into genuine diversification and resilience.

Teona Lavrelashvili Eastern Partnership Foreign Policy

In a stunning and deliberate pivot, Georgia’s government has effectively slammed the brakes on its European integration journey. Yesterday, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced that the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party would suspend starting EU accession talks until 2028 and refuse European budgetary support. This declaration follows a cascade of alarming developments, including widespread allegations of electoral fraud during the October 26 parliamentary elections and an increasingly critical stance from Brussels regarding Georgia’s democratic backsliding.

By framing this decision as a defence against external interference, the GD leadership has sent a clear and unambiguous message: the government is no longer officially pursuing EU integration. This development marks the culmination of what can be described as a constitutional coup, evident in two key aspects.

First, it directly contradicts Article 78 of the Constitution of Georgia, which enshrines EU membership as an irreversible path for the country. Second, the first session of the Parliament was convened without the approval of the President, despite the Constitution not granting any authority to Parliament to act as a substitute in such circumstances.

Democratic Backsliding: A Calculated Retreat

The October 26 elections were more than a litmus test for democracy—they became a stage for its systematic dismantling. Reports from international observers detailed voter intimidation, breaches of ballot secrecy, vote buying, and other irregularities. The opposition, rejecting the results, has boycotted parliament, while President Salome Zurabishvili has taken the unprecedented step of challenging the elections in the Constitutional Court, citing violations of ballot secrecy and the disenfranchisement of Georgian expatriates.

These developments do not reflect a broken system but rather a deliberate strategy by Georgian Dream to consolidate its grip on power. The decision to appoint a new president—bereft of diplomatic experience, lacking even a university degree, and best known for championing the Russia-inspired “foreign agents” law – sends a clear and unapologetic signal to Brussels that GD has little interest in maintaining its European trajectory. Loyal to GD and its oligarchic backer Bidzina Ivanishvili, this figure’s selection stands in sharp contrast to the current President, Salome Zurabishvili, who will be the last directly elected President of Georgia and whose mandate expires in a month. Known for her pro-Western orientation, Zurabishvili has become a thorn in the ruling Georgian Dream party’s side while simultaneously serving as a unifying figure for Georgia’s fragmented opposition.

GD’s retreat from European norms is deliberate and methodical. By portraying EU integration as a threat to Georgian sovereignty, the government appeals to conservative values and exploits national pride. Framing EU membership as contingent on adopting liberal policies such as same-sex marriage, the ruling party positions the EU as an antagonist meddling in Georgia’s domestic affairs. This rhetoric seeks to undermine public support for EU membership, even as 80% of Georgians continue to view the EU as a path to prosperity and security.

EU Response So Far

The European Union has responded with growing alarm but measured action. It has not recognised the results of the October 26 elections, apart from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—who prematurely congratulated Georgian authorities before the official results were announced. The EU has announced the deployment of a technical mission to investigate the reported irregularities and electoral fraud.

Yesterday, the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning the elections, calling for new elections, and recommending sanctions against GD leaders for democratic backsliding, electoral violations, and abuse of state resources. The resolution also urged the EU to reassess its visa facilitation agreement with Georgia, warning of a potential suspension if democratic standards continue to erode.

Predictably, this resolution provoked a strong reaction from Georgian Dream. Prime Minister Kobakhidze seized on the resolution as a pretext to halt accession talks entirely, portraying it as evidence of Brussels’ undue interference. This calculated act of defiance fits seamlessly into the government’s broader narrative of sovereignty under siege- an argument strategically deployed to rationalise its increasingly authoritarian grip on power.

The Stakes for Georgia’s Future Could Not Be Higher

The decision to freeze EU accession talks until 2028 will isolate Georgia internationally while deeply undermining the aspirations of its people. For ordinary Georgians, EU integration is not an abstract ideal but a tangible hope for economic stability, freedom, and democratic governance. Yet, the ruling party’s actions have thrown these aspirations into jeopardy, creating a growing chasm between a government entrenched in power and a population yearning for a European future.

Protests erupted throughout Georgia after the PM’s announcement. With protests becoming stronger, riot police started gathering close to the Parliament building and the Freedom Square and started dispersing the rally with tear gas, pepper spray and water cannons. The rally will resume today.

The EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) meeting on December 16 is set to discuss Georgia once again. The EU Ambassador to Georgia has stated that “all options are on the table,” including the potential suspension of visa liberalisation.

Yet, the potential suspension of visa liberalisation—a step the EU may take if democratic backsliding persists—would disproportionately harm ordinary Georgians, restricting their ability to travel, study, and work in Europe. Meanwhile, the ruling elites, insulated by wealth and power, remain largely unaffected. This dynamic threatens to deepen public disillusionment and political polarisation in a country already grappling with fragile institutions.

Not An End!

The decision to halt Georgia’s EU integration is not a decision by Georgia, but a unilateral choice by the ruling party – yet it is a watershed moment in the nation’s history. The choices made today will reverberate for decades, shaping Georgia’s political trajectory, economic prospects, and role on the global stage. This is a pivotal juncture, determining whether the country continues its journey toward Europe or falls back into the orbit of imperialist Russia.

Therefore, this moment cannot and should not mark the end of Georgia’s European story. Instead, it serves as a stark reminder of democracy’s vulnerability. Whether this turning point is remembered as the day Georgia abandoned Europe, or as the beginning of its return towards the EU will depend on the resilience of its people, but first and foremost on the commitment of its international allies.

Now is the time for the EU to reaffirm its commitment to the Georgian people and their European dream. This requires a strategy that moves beyond rhetoric – one that mobilises civil society, empowers grassroots movements, and draws on the strength of the Georgian diaspora to bridge the growing divide between Georgia and Europe. Such a vision must inspire and sustain those of us who continue to believe in the promise of a democratic, European future for our country – one that will bring it closer to becoming an integral part of the European Union.

Teona Lavrelashvili Democracy Eastern Partnership Enlargement EU-Russia

The political climate in Georgia teeters on the edge of a dangerous precipice. On 14^th of May, the ruling Georgian Dream party passed the “Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence”, a measure reminiscent of Kremlin-style governance.

Widely referred to as the “Russian Law” and “Foreign Agents Law”, it has faced strong opposition both domestically and internationally, casting a dark cloud over Georgia’s democratic aspirations and its pursuit of closer ties with the European Union. This law was hastily pushed through in a parliamentary session lasting just a minute and a half, amidst chaotic scenes within and outside the parliament building, where riot police used tear gas to disperse protesters and MPs engaged in physical squabbles.

What is wrong with the law?

The law’s adoption isn’t inherently hazardous, aside from its problematic wording and several objectionable clauses. In fact, in a well-established democracy, a revised version of this law might even prove beneficial. Yet, without the essential checks and balances, and with a judiciary that is subordinate to an overly dominant executive branch, this legislation could easily lay the foundation for oppressive measures, much like those seen in Russia.

Although the term “agent” has been removed, the newly named “Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence” retains problematic elements that could be exploited to suppress critical voices. Organisations receiving more than 20% of their funding from foreign sources are required to register as “organisations serving the interests of a foreign power.” This stipulation not only stigmatises these groups but also threatens to polarise Georgian society, fostering divisions and radicalisation.

Particularly alarming is Article 8 of the law, which grants the government extensive powers to interfere in the activities of these organisations without clear mandates or oversight. This could lead to an abuse of power reminiscent of authoritarian regimes. The Minister of Justice is empowered to monitor these organisations based on very broad criteria, including potentially any statement from virtually any individual, infringing on privacy and setting a dangerous precedent for data protection rights violations.

The timing is also perilous

The enactment of this law comes at a critical moment in Georgia’s domestic politics and its relations with the EU. Having been granted EU candidate status in December 2023, Georgia was poised to make significant strides toward EU membership—a goal that seemed almost unattainable just a few years ago. This year, by meeting the EU’s conditions, Georgia could realistically expect to have a fair opportunity to begin accession talks. However, with the current law, the chances of advancing to open accession talks remain slim, as the likely consequences of the law will endanger the nine steps required for progress, which include the protection of human rights and the freedom of civil society and media.

With parliamentary elections scheduled for October, the ruling party’s anti-western stance and the enactment of this legislation could significantly impact their popularity. Yet, it remains uncertain whether they will be decisively defeated and replaced by a coalition government. The hope lies with the opposition and the revitalised civil society and youth movements, which have positioned EU integration as a pillar of their national identity and struggle.

How should the EU respond?

The European Union faces a complex dilemma. Harsh measures such as halting visa liberalisation or revoking Georgia’s candidate status might alienate the Georgian people and strengthen the government’s narrative that the EU is shutting its doors. On the other hand, a softer approach could allow authoritarian tendencies to further entrench themselves.

One could observe that Joseph Borrell, EU Foreign Policy Chief, underlined this dilemma in today’s statement. While criticising the law’s spirit and content as contrary to EU norms, the EU has not yet announced concrete actions against Georgia. A possible response could include targeted personal sanctions against key figures who perpetuate anti-democratic policies. Additionally, the EU could amplify its support for judicial reforms, aiming to develop a judiciary capable of acting as the last bastion against authoritarianism and poor governance.

As Georgia stands at this pivotal moment, the EU’s involvement is more crucial than ever. Beyond sanctions and structural reforms, the EU should spearhead an effective and strategic information campaign to better elucidate its positions on key issues affecting Georgian society. This would aid not only Georgia but also serve as a model for how the EU engages with other candidate countries facing similar challenges.

Georgia’s path toward EU membership is fraught with obstacles, yet with strategic engagement and support from the EU, combined with the unabated enthusiasm of the Georgian population to fight for EU ideals, the only way forward for Georgia remains firmly oriented towards Europe.

Teona Lavrelashvili Democracy Eastern Partnership Values

One can only be deeply moved by the sight of exhausted Armenians, fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh in droves. Over a hundred years after the Armenian genocide (perpetrated by the Young Turks in 1915-1917, though still not officially acknowledged by Türkiye), and the establishment of the first Armenian state in 1918, the lightning Azeri offensive forced the so-called “Republic of Artsakh” to capitulate to Baku. The 30-year-old republic will officially cease to exist on January 1, 2024.

Up until this point, more than 100,000 of its 120,000 residents have crossed the border into the Republic of Armenia through the Lachin corridor, the only passage connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has characterised this humanitarian crisis as an ethnic cleansing orchestrated by Baku. Azeris vehemently deny these allegations, emphasising the humanitarian aid provided to the remaining Armenians, while promising them the same rights as other Azerbaijani citizens.

The fear of living under Ilham Aliyev’s authoritarian regime, coupled with the deep-seated historical enmity between the two nations, has left Karabakh Armenians with very few options. All of this appears to be a natural progression following the ten-month blockade of the Lachin corridor, which deprived Nagorno-Karabakh and its people of essential supplies. The international community has not only failed to reverse the course of this siege but, worse yet, has fallen short in reassuring its population about its future.

The usually vocal and justly assertive EU in defending human rights and opposing any form of violence has, this time, chosen to remain silent. Only the European Parliament managed to raise a strong voice and condemn Azerbaijan. The crucial energy partnership, though, between Brussels and Baku diminishes the possibility of taking harsh measures against Azerbaijan’s aggression. On the other side of the Atlantic, Washington does not appear willing or able to risk direct involvement in the region, offering only general statements about “restraining further hostilities and engaging both parties in finding a lasting and sustainable peace agreement.”

Meanwhile, Russia, the most significant third-party actor in the region with troops on the ground, has done little to halt the Azeris. Moscow, deeply embroiled in its own war in Ukraine, was unwilling to support a country whose leadership repeatedly displayed signs of “disobedience”. Yerevan’s decision to condemn Russia’s attack on Kyiv and its recent alignment with the International Criminal Court in prosecuting Putin has outraged the Kremlin. Even if the Russians aim to appear as peace brokers in the Caucasus, their inaction has clearly undermined their role and presence there.

But who truly benefits from the current situation in the South Caucasus? Undoubtedly, Azerbaijan, capitalising on its rapid economic growth and geopolitical position, has built a robust military and, by forging the right alliances, launched an attack on Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. Their strategic goal of erasing the Armenian presence in the enclave was achieved with the second operation on September 19. However, this may not be the end of this long-standing conflict. Aliyev openly shares Turkish President Erdoğan’s grandiose idea of “one nation, two states” and envisions Türkiye as the mother and protector of all Turkic peoples.

Ankara has established a foothold in the Caucasus, and Turkish aspirations for an expanded sphere of influence from the Balkans to Central Asia seem promising. One of the last obstacles to this is southeastern Armenia, a narrow strip of land dividing Nakhichevan (West Azerbaijan) from the eastern part of the country. Azerbaijan has already threatened Armenia with the use of force if the “Angezur/Meghri corridor” does not open, disregarding Western appeals and Iranian warnings not to challenge the latter’s sovereignty.

It is concerning that the West appears comfortable with the two Turkic states acting as a bulwark against Russian expansion in the region. However, unchecked Turkish influence in the wider region may be difficult to restrain later, especially given Erdoğan’s unreliable relationship with the West over the past decade.

Israel, especially in light of the recent terrorist attacks within its territory, is poised to leverage its longstanding support for Azerbaijan. The latitude granted to its intelligence services to operate near the Iranian borders could potentially prove crucial in the event of a confrontation with Iran. In contrast, Tehran’s vocal support for the Armenians has proven to be ineffective. The situation may worsen for the Islamic Republic if Baku follows through with its corridor threats, cutting off Iranians not only from Armenia, but subsequently from their closest ally, Russia.

However, no matter how painful the situation is for the Armenians, the party due to receive the most blame for the current, dire situation of the “Artsakh” is the shortsighted leadership in Yerevan over the years. They proved incapable of keeping up with the developments and dynamics in their own neighbourhood and the wider world over the past three decades. Their heavy reliance on Russia, who has cleverly cultivated the myth of being the protector of Caucasus Christians, was revealed to be fragile. After the 2018 Armenian Revolution, the shift towards the West was sudden, unprepared, and without a deep assessment of the risks involved.

The Armenian exodus does not mark the end of the conflict. The complexity of Armenian-Azeri relations and the involvement of additional actors compared to the past create an explosive mix. The West, in general, needs to determine whether the protection of human rights and liberal democracy outweighs the allure of cheap natural gas prices. Armenia’s accession to NATO would have been a good first step in stabilising the region. Otherwise, it is only a matter of time before a new spark ignites the entire region once again.

Panos Tasiopoulos Eastern Partnership EU-Russia Foreign Policy