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Europe’s declining productivity growth has become a central constraint on long-term prosperity. For over two decades, productivity gains have weakened across most EU Member States, while the gap vis-à-vis the US and leading Asian economies has widened. Recent flagship reports—the Letta Report on the Single Market and the Draghi Report on Competitiveness—show that Europe’s competitiveness challenge is structural, persistent, and urgent.
While low investment, fragmented markets, and slow innovation diffusion are well known, one part of the problem lies in Europe’s missing independent scientific advisory capacity on productivity and competitiveness as the basis for evidence-based policymaking. Structural reforms often require long time horizons, cross-policy coordination, and political resolve beyond electoral cycles. Yet EU and national policymaking often remain biased toward short-term measures and legislative output rather than economic outcomes. Addressing Europe’s productivity challenge requires better policies and corresponding policy advice institutions at the European level.
Why independent scientific economic policy advice matters
Research shows that independent, scientifically grounded advice improves policymaking. Advisory institutions diagnose trends early, develop long-term reform frameworks, filter flawed proposals, and translate evidence into actionable policy. They also inform public debate and strengthen accountability by making trade-offs transparent.
Politically, such institutions can make a difference: policymakers often postpone reforms with long-term benefits while prioritising visible short-term measures. Independent bodies embed long-term economic reasoning and highlight the economic costs of inaction. Effectiveness increases when advice combines independence with visibility through clear communication and public engagement.
National Productivity Boards without a sister institution at the EU level
National Productivity Boards (NPBs), established following the 2016 Council Recommendation, have improved evidence-based policymaking by analysing productivity trends, competitiveness drivers, and reform needs.
However, no EU-level institution currently aggregates NPB findings or translates them into coherent EU guidance. This limits the value of the NPBs, as many of the challenges they identify are European rather than national: energy market fragmentation, incomplete capital and digital markets, missing cross-border infrastructure, and uncoordinated innovation funding cannot be solved by Member States alone.
In addition, stronger coordination and harmonisation of the NPBs as independent scientific advisory bodies could pay off in terms of comparability and impact at the national level. Currently, their institutional designs differ in independence, resources, data access, and visibility; weak legal anchoring and unstable funding further constrain effectiveness.
Draghi’s warning: Europe is losing speed
Mario Draghi has highlighted Europe’s investment and innovation gaps and criticised slow policymaking, regulatory uncertainty, and a lack of strategic prioritisation. Legislative activity is rewarded, while policy effectiveness and learning from failure receive little recognition. Weak evaluation mechanisms and limited independent scrutiny allow ineffective policies to accumulate raising costs and undermining competitiveness.
A European Productivity Board: strengthening independent scientific advice at the EU level
A European Productivity Board (EPB) would complement national boards and establish independent scientific policy advice at the EU level by aggregating NPB analyses, producing EU-wide assessments of productivity trends and competitiveness, identifying structural bottlenecks and reform priorities, and contributing to the harmonisation of NPB methodologies and data.
The EPB should be independent, composed of a rotating committee of European experts supported by a permanent analytical secretariat, with transparent appointment procedures, financial autonomy, and full publication rights. It should advise the European Commission while reporting to the European Parliament, reinforcing accountability and remaining outside day-to-day policymaking in order to provide unbiased ex ante advice, rigorous ex post evaluations, and monitor of the implementation.
A pragmatic step towards a more competitive Europe
Europe’s productivity challenge is no longer a question of diagnosis but of action. National Productivity Boards have contributed to improving evidence-based debate at the Member State level, yet many of the binding constraints on productivity—such as market fragmentation, weak diffusion of innovation, energy market inefficiencies, and regulatory complexity—are fundamentally European in nature. A European Productivity Board (EPB) would add clear value by aggregating national evidence, harmonising methodologies, and translating fragmented diagnoses into coherent, EU-wide policy guidance.
Crucially, the EPB would embody a qualitatively different mode of policymaking: insulated from day-to-day political bargaining, institutionally anchored, and explicitly mandated to adopt a long-term perspective that electoral cycles and administrative incentives routinely undermine. Experience shows that structural reforms are often delayed, weakened, or abandoned as a result of vested interests and entrenched status-quo biases. Ultimately, productivity-enhancing reform hinges on political will. However, such will rarely materialises spontaneously. Sustained, evidence-based awareness generated by an independent scientific body that delivers credible, transparent, and comparable analysis of Europe’s structural bottlenecks—while clearly identifying actionable policy pathways at the EU level—can reshape public debate, empower reform-oriented policymakers, and increase the political cost of inaction or purely symbolic policies. By reporting publicly and to the European Parliament, an EPB would not supplant democratic decision-making; it would reinforce it by providing policymakers and citizens with a robust analytical foundation to challenge entrenched interests and translate long-recognised reform priorities into effective, implemented policy.
Hence, establishing a European Productivity Board represents a pragmatic and timely institutional innovation, aligned with a reform-oriented and competitiveness-focused vision for Europe’s future.
A longer version of this article will be published in European View soon.
Andreas Reinstaller Tobias Thomas Competitiveness Economy

Andreas Reinstaller

Tobias Thomas
Recharging Europe’s Competitiveness: Why the EU Needs a European Productivity Board
Blog
21 Jan 2026
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The European Union has a growth problem. Its share of the global economy has been on a steady decline for decades, dropping from over 20 per cent in 2000 to around 15 per cent currently. In part, this is due to catch-up growth in developing countries but the EU has also lagged behind its peer across the Atlantic, the United States. Europe’s productivity growth, rate of innovation and ability to foster new, innovative companies all compare unfavourably with the US.
At the same time, the EU is operating in an increasingly difficult external environment. Russian aggression has led to increased energy prices as well the need for increased defence spending, putting strain on public purses that were already under pressure from high debt levels, mediocre productivity growth and higher health and pension spending as populations age. Meanwhile, the US has turned increasingly protectionist and has broken with WTO rules, forcing the EU to accept higher tariffs. China, on the other hand, has been an aggressive competitor, putting increasing price pressure on European products, both in the European domestic market and export markets.
The first step towards solving a problem is acknowledging its existence. In that respect, Europe has done well, with not one, but two major reports coming out last year by former Italian prime ministers Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi. These reports do a good job laying out the productivity challenge and the various ways the EU can address them. However, many of their proposals are politically very ambitious, and face resistance from member-states that are loath to give up additional powers to the EU. For instance, the banking and capital market unions are long-standing projects that would provide obvious benefits for the EU but have made little headway against national opposition. Similarly, the issuance of EU bonds has been limited to exceptional circumstances such as the pandemic, and although European financial markets would clearly benefit from an EU-level safe asset, there is little chance of this happening in the near future.
This paper provides a reform agenda that would boost economic growth while also being politically feasible within current political constraints. By focusing on a few key issues – better regulation, energy, a savings and investment union, and the single market for services – we hope to provide a trigger for practical action that would leave Europe better able to foster the growth it needs.
Competitiveness Economy Single Market
A reform agenda for the single market
Other
19 Dec 2025
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This policy brief argues that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) should be refocused on the duty of loyalty in data relationships. This would allow a much-needed simplification of the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act). The purpose is to establish a regulatory focus on addressing the data power wielded by powerful entities online, while improving competitiveness. This can be achieved by the light-touch regulation of data processing entities that do not pose a significant risk to democracy and rights. The duty of loyalty requires that anybody processing personal data must act in the best interests of the people who may be affected by that processing. The higher the risk related to data processing, the greater the regulatory demands posed by the duty of loyalty. Such an approach would allow regulatory attention to focus on data power in the infosphere. Entities that hold such power should face strict duties and clear prohibitions; those that do not should meet only proportionate requirements.
AI Competitiveness
Reforming the EU’s GDPR and AI Act: Handling Data Power While Improving Competitiveness
Policy Briefs
05 Dec 2025

