Critical raw materials matter. They are absolutely fundamental to our manufacturing, to emerging and critical technologies and to our very defence in the face of growing geopolitical threats. It is hardly far-fetched to claim that access to critical materials will determine Europe’s future, be it whether our industries remain competitive, whether the green transition will lead to less or more technological dependencies, or whether we can even produce the capabilities to defend themselves.

Therefore, as its geopolitical posture grows more assertive, it should come as no surprise that adversaries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) seek to weaponise the supply chains of critical materials (and especially rare earths). As policy-makers, journalists and experts often like to cite, a staggering 98% of the European Union’s (EU) rare earth magnet demand is supplied by the PRC over which it wields a stranglehold, as witnessed by expanding export control regimes impacting entire industries or even targeting specific sectors, including defence.

It is in this context that in 2024 the EU adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), a key legislative document which formed a fundamental part of the European Commission’s (EC) thinking about economic security, de-risking and reducing key dependencies on third countries. Given the political will, CRMA was successfully passed through the legislative process and inter-institutional negotiations in a matter of months – a rare feat in the world of EU decision-making.