

# Migration Update

March 2026



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The purpose of these news summaries is to provide a factual base for migration debates within the European centre-right. [Vít Novotný](#) is responsible for the selection of information items from the media, governments and social media. The value of these summaries is in the categorisation of information items and in listing those items that readers might have missed. Facts and opinions are conveyed as they are reported. Original comments are kept to a minimum. These news summaries are not subject to a formal editorial process. Thanks go to Marek Gallo for writing up Slovenia’s and Denmark’s parliamentary election campaigns. Rainer Münz and Claudia Masi contributed news items for this issue. Should you have any questions or comments, please contact Vít Novotný at [vn@martenscentre.eu](mailto:vn@martenscentre.eu).

- More than 130,000 people have **crossed into Syria** and over 1 million people have been displaced **inside Lebanon** since early March, as the war in the Middle East drives growing cross-border movements and displacement, [according to the IOM](#). Most are Syrian nationals; several thousand are Lebanese. Around half of those crossing [are](#) children. Up to **3.2 million people have been displaced** inside Iran, according to the UN. Cross-border movements from Iran remain limited and far below both pre-war levels and internal displacement inside Iran.

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## **NEW PACT ON MIGRATION**

The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) [published](#) a brief entitled *National Implementation Plans and National Strategies under the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum*.

- ‘Two of the acts, the Asylum Migration Management Regulation (AMMR, Article 84) and the Asylum Processes Regulation (APR, Article 75) required all member states to establish **national implementation plans**... by December 2024, calling for concrete measures, actions and timelines to operationalise the Pact at the national level. The [national implementation plans] were based on a template provided by the European Commission...
- The AMMR (Article 7) further required member states to adopt **a national strategy** to establish coherent, strategic frameworks to ensure adequate capacity for the effective implementation of their asylum and migration policies.’

### **National implementation plans**

‘As of February 2026, 28 out of 30 EU+ countries have submitted a national implementation plan. Schengen Associated Countries also submitted a [plan], covering elements of the Pact in which they take part. **Hungary and Poland** informed the European Commission of their decision not to prepare or submit a plan.’

The following countries published their plans: Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.

‘Sweden makes it available on demand. Estonia has published a summary and Malta made partial information available.

Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Portugal, Romania and Switzerland have **not made their plans publicly available**.’

### **National strategies**

‘As of February 2026, 25 member states have submitted a national strategy to the European Commission. **Denmark** is not bound by the obligation to prepare it, while **Hungary** informed that it will not submit one.’

The following countries made their national strategies publicly available: Bulgaria, Czechia, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Spain. The remaining national strategies were **not publicly available**.

‘The Schengen Associated Countries did not submit a national strategy, as they are not bound by Part II of the AMMR.’

### **Return Regulation**

On 26 March, the plenary of the European Parliament ‘[endorsed the opening of talks with Council](#) on the new legal framework for the return of people without the right to stay in the EU. With 389 votes in favour, 206 against and 32 abstentions, the European Parliament agreed to proceed to the next stage of the legislative process... The plenary vote took place following three separate requests by the S&D, Greens/EFA, and The Left political groups challenging the 9 March 2026 decisions taken in the Civil Liberties Committee [to put to vote and approve an alternative text supported by the EPP, ECR, P/E and ESN]. Rapporteur Malik Azmani (Renew, NL) will lead Parliament’s negotiating team.’

### **ASYLUM FIGURES FOR 2025**

According to the EUAA’s *Latest Asylum Trends*, EU+ countries [received](#) around 822,000 asylum applications during 2025, **19 % fewer applications in 2025** than in 2024, following a decrease of 11 % in 2024. The decrease in 2025 was largely driven by fewer applications by Syrians, Bangladeshis and Turks. Despite the overall decline, applications by Afghan nationals increased, primarily reflecting claims lodged by women already present in the EU+.

**Afghans** (117,000) were the citizenship with the most applications in 2025, with the number increasing by one third (+ 33 %) in the EU+. However, this figure is considered stable compared to 2023 and is lower than in 2022. The significant year-over-year increase is largely attributed to a judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in October 2024, which confirmed that Taliban-imposed restrictions on women amount to persecution. As a result, Afghan applications began to rise in 2025, peaking first in Austria and then in Germany. In this context, around 41 % of Afghan applications were repeated applications and therefore did not reflect new arrivals to the EU+.

With applications increasing by nearly a quarter (+ 23 %), **Venezuelans** (91,000) lodged both the highest number of applications on record and were the second most populous citizenship applying in 2025. The vast majority applied in Spain (94 %). This year-to-year increase was greater than the increase observed between 2023 and 2024. It is owed to a confluence of factors including restrictive immigration policies adopted by the US administration and tightened visa requirements imposed on Venezuelans in neighbouring Latin American countries. In the EU+, Venezuelans currently benefit from visa-free access to the Schengen area as well as a long-standing Spanish practice to grant national forms of protection to Venezuelan applicants who do not meet the criteria for international protection.

**Syrians (42,000)** were the third most frequent nationality to lodge a claim, with 72 % fewer applications compared to 2024 as a consequence of the fall of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad.

In 2025, some 49% of applications were lodged by citizenships who had **recognition rates of 20%** or less in 2024. [This is relevant for the implementation of the New Pact and its mandatory border procedure.]

In both 2024 and 2025, **'around a quarter** of all asylum applications in the EU+ were lodged by nationals of countries with visa-free access to the Schengen area, meaning they can arrive on flights legally and directly from their home countries. Spain tends to receive the largest share of such applications, with visa-free nationals usually **accounting for around three quarters of its total inflow.**'

Separately, EUAA Director Nina Gregori [stated](#) that despite a decrease in the number of **secondary movements** in 2025, these also accounted for **a quarter of the total applications.**

According to data presented by [one analyst](#) and confirmed by [Frontex](#), the decline in the numbers of asylum seekers is not due to EU border controls or interceptions outside the EU borders, but the fact that **Syrians and Afghans** residing in the geographical vicinity of the EU **have been returning to their home countries** instead of continuing their journeys toward the EU. For example, in Türkiye, the number of Syrians with temporary protection has fallen from 3.74 million in 2023 to 2.37 million. Since around 240,000 Syrians have been naturalised, a net total of 1.13 million Syrians has left Türkiye, mainly for Syria.

## **IRAN AND LEBANON**

In response to the US and Israeli bombing of Iran and Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the EU and Türkiye stepped up their **contingency planning** for the scenario of large people movements.

On 4 March, **Türkiye's** interior minister Mustafa Ciftci [said](#) the country drew up plans to deal with a potential inflow of people fleeing the war in neighbouring Iran, with preparations including possible buffer zones along the frontier, and tent camps. He added that Türkiye 'had prepared initial capacity to host up to 90,000 people in the event of a sudden inflow, including tent camps and temporary accommodation sites.'

In her 15 March [letter](#) to the heads of state, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen [stated](#) that:

- 'the conflict has not translated into immediate migratory flows towards the EU, what the future holds remains unclear and necessitates the full mobilisation of every migration diplomacy tool we have at our disposal. It is therefore imperative that we work with countries in the region, such as Türkiye, Lebanon and Pakistan. Over the past days, I have myself spoken to all leaders in the region, and members of the College are in regular contact with their counterparts.
- We will ensure continued increased situational awareness. Commission services are monitoring developments through the Migration Preparedness

and Crisis Blueprint Network, in close cooperation with Member States, EU Agencies, as well as IOM and UNHCR. The EU must stand ready to support affected countries and respond quickly to the emerging needs on the ground.

- Along the border between Iran and Türkiye the situation remains relatively stable due to the increased border control measures implemented by the Turkish authorities. Since 2021, the EU has allocated more than EUR 1.1 billion in support to Türkiye in the areas of migration and border management, including EUR 305 million for the protection and voluntary return of Syrian refugees, as well as EUR 431 million for the strengthening of the eastern and south-eastern borders. The implementation of these projects is ongoing, and their timely completion will contribute to Türkiye's ability to respond to emerging challenges.'

In a joint letter from 18 March, **PMs Giorgia Meloni and Mette Frederiksen** [called on](#) the European Commission to “examine mechanisms that can serve as an emergency brake and be triggered as a *force majeure* in the event of large-scale migration flows towards the Union”. ‘One cannot risk a repeat of the refugee influx seen in 2015/16, Meloni and Frederiksen wrote in their justification. “That would not only be a humanitarian disaster for the people directly affected but would also jeopardise the security and cohesion of the Union.”’, according to *FAZ*.

Iran [hosts](#) a large migrant population, including an estimated 4.4 million Afghan and 290,000 Iraqi nationals, who rely on stable access to services and livelihoods. According to *The Economist*, around 24 million ‘migrant [workers live in the Gulf](#)—most of them from South and South-East Asia—and are at risk of being caught in the crossfire. Remittances from the Middle East, equivalent to around 1% of GDP in India and up to 5% in Pakistan, are a crucial source of income for families.’ According to [Aljazeera figures](#), foreign workers make up the bulk of the populations in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Only in Saudi Arabia and Oman local populations are in the majority. According to EU’s humanitarian commissioner Hadja Lahbib, ‘there are a total of some [500,000 EU citizens](#) in the Middle East, but not all of those are expected to want to leave.’

## **EU-SWITZERLAND**

Switzerland will pay the EU EUR €375 million per year to get access to its single market as part of an agreement announced on 2 March. The deal will also mean unfettered freedom of movement for Swiss nationals and for their EU counterparts to live and work in Switzerland.

- Switzerland will apply current and future Union law on the free movement of persons and posting of workers and therefore be subject to the same rules as member states. Switzerland will [not have](#) the possibility to place a cap on free movement.
- The Agreement contains exceptions to the application of EU rules on issues of particular sensitivity to Switzerland. These include the granting of **permanent residence** after five years of residence in Switzerland (which will be limited to economically active persons and members of their families) and expulsions, where the current regime is preserved.

- Regarding **students**, the existing exception has been amended so that EU and Swiss students are treated equally concerning tuition fees and support mechanisms at universities that are primarily publicly funded.

### **EU-NIGERIA**

[Following years of negotiations] the EU has ‘made real progress on the [EU-Nigeria Readmission Agreement](#) to ensure safe and dignified returns of those Nigerians who can no longer stay in the EU’, according to Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. At a joint press conference following the 8th Nigeria-EU Ministerial Dialogue, Kallas thanked Nigeria’s FM Yusuf Maitama Tuggar, ‘for initialising the agreement’. At the same time, the Commission ‘[announced](#) a new Team Europe investment package of EUR 290 million to be immediately mobilised in seven new operations in digitalisation, health and agricultural value chains as well as for migration management in the framework of the EU Global Gateway strategy.’

### **BELARUS-EU**

Belarus is training migrants to **fight European border guards**, the head of Latvia’s security service said... In an... interview with *The Telegraph*, Normunds Mežviets said the migrants were being [trained in combat](#) at special camps and pushed across the EU’s borders into Poland and the Baltic states.

### **EU-UK**

Smugglers [are launching](#) migrant small boats from beaches in **Belgium** away from the traditional sites around Calais and Dunkirk. Belgian authorities say gangs are using so-called "taxi boats" that move along the coast to pick up migrants in the water before heading towards France.... The UK government has provided **GBP 1.3m** to Belgian law enforcement to deter smuggling attempts.

### **EU-TÜRKIYE**

A report by Frontex’s fundamental rights officer, Jonas Grimheden, alleged that an Afghan unit, operating under the supervision of three Greek officers, robbed, stabbed and beat the group of newly arrived migrants on 22 June 2023 at the Greek Evros river with Türkiye. Allegation is that Greece deployed an [armed Afghan paramilitary unit](#) to violently assault a group of 61 mostly-Turkish nationals seeking political asylum.

### **EMIGRATION**

*The Economist* [analysed](#) emigration from 31 Western countries, including Australia, Britain, Canada, France and Germany. It found that ‘roughly 4m people emigrated from those places in 2024, about 20% more than just before the pandemic.... The surge in emigration is, in part, the unwinding of a huge immigration boom in 2022 and 2023.’ However, these countries own citizens are leaving in larger numbers too.

## **RETURNS WITHIN AFRICA**

[According to](#) the Commission president, ‘EU support to Tunisia continues to focus on the various aspects of migration, including border management, the fight against migrant smuggling, protection, legal migration, assisted voluntary returns and sustainable reintegration.... In 2025, IOM facilitated the **voluntary return of 8,853 migrants from Tunisia** to their countries of origin. Assisted voluntary returns **from North African countries** to countries of origin have also intensified significantly through EU-funded operations, with over 35,800 returns in 2025.’

## **WORKING MIGRANTS**

The **German government** is making a new attempt to increase the number of non-EU nationals with a residence permit to work. Labour Minister Bärbel Bas (SPD) [intends to establish](#) a so-called ‘Work and Stay Agency’. The agency is intended to accelerate, **digitise and centralise the immigration of skilled workers**. ‘With the digital Work and Stay Agency, we are breaking down the bureaucratic barriers that have hitherto made access to the German labour market difficult.’ The latest statistics from the Federal Agency for Employment show that there are just over 300,000 people with a residence permit to work from countries outside the EU. **Just over 106,000 people** have a long-term settlement permit for work.

**Poland’s** ministry of family, labour and social policy is [working](#) on a regulation intended to **restrict the right of nationals of Georgia, Colombia and Venezuela** to perform work in Poland, where they are staying on the basis of **visa-free travel**. Currently, nationals of these countries who hold a valid work permit may enter Poland without a visa and commence employment. The ministry intends to limit this possibility due to the alleged risk of irregular migration and abuse related to false declarations regarding the purpose of their stay in Poland. If the regulation enters into force, nationals of these countries will still be able to work in Poland, but they will be required to obtain a [national] visa prior to entering the country. The new regulation is expected to be issued in the second quarter of 2026.

[According to](#) a study by Funcas, ‘47% of **Spain’s** economic growth in recent years is explained by the role of migrants in the labour force. Without them, the country would not have been able to expand its economy as much, making it impossible for higher-added-value sectors to grow and therefore create the better-paid jobs that locals have benefited from.’

More than 50 countries worldwide issued **digital nomad visas** (‘dedicated remote-work residence visas’) in 2025. According to an [Immigrant Invest](#) ranking based on living costs, tax treatment, and routes to longer-term residence, ‘Spain takes the top spot, followed by Malta, Portugal, Germany, and Hungary.’

## **FRANCE**

[According to](#) a study by the Observatory for Immigration and Demography, immigration from sub-Saharan Africa plays a central role in accelerating migration flows to France. The immigrant population from this geographical area has increased by 150% since 2006 – three times higher than the average for all geographical origins.... The annual number of sub-Saharan immigrants has doubled in less than

ten years. They now account for 25% of all immigrants entering the country, compared with 13% in 2006... Originating from countries with low human development levels and driven by **family and humanitarian reasons**, sub-Saharan immigration faces difficulties in terms of economic and social integration. Only 25% of new arrivals registered in 2023 were in employment at the beginning of the following year.'

## UK

'The UK government will **stop issuing study visas** to people from Afghanistan, Cameroon, Myanmar and Sudan from this month, Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood [said](#), as well as stopping skilled work visas to Afghans. The Home Office said the action was being taken due to what it said was widespread visa abuse. According to official figures, people from the four countries were the most likely to make an asylum claim after originally coming to the UK to study. "The government is **clamping down on visa abuse** so the UK can maintain its ability and proud tradition of helping those genuinely in need," a government spokesperson added.'

## FOREIGN MILITARY RECRUITMENT

Over 27,000 people from other countries [were recruited](#) to **help fight Russia's war** in Ukraine, according to Ukrainian authorities. "This number is larger than some armed forces in some of the European countries," said Andriy Yusov, a Ukrainian intelligence spokesperson... Yusov said the numbers have been increasing year-on-year. In 2023, Russia enlisted 3,808 foreign fighters, followed by 8,265 in 2024 and almost 14,000 last year... Most of them are sourced from post-Soviet states such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan... More recent recruits are also being sourced from Africa and South America, in particular Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria and Brazil.

## USA

'The US government is **taking fees** from immigrants and US sponsors for services that it has no plans to provide. The government took their money, and now it won't even adjudicate their applications—in many cases, it refuses even to issue denials. The State Department is actually telling consular officers not to notify future applicants that the government has banned them', [according to](#) CATO Institute.

Guards at Alligator Alcatraz, a migrant 'detention centre in the Everglades, west of Miami, wear patches with skulls and ominous messages on their uniforms. One design depicts a [grim reaper wielding a scythe](#) over a crocodile skeleton alongside the text: "Alligator Alcatraz" and "You can't hide," surrounded by small skulls and against a background resembling prison bars.... It is unclear whether the patch design was officially approved or if it reflects internal messages from security personnel. Critical Response Strategies, the Jacksonville-based security firm contracted by the State of Florida for which the guards work, did not respond to a request for comment' from *El País*. "If we've learned anything from the Trump era, it's that cruelty often comes across—or is disguised—as humour," says Dr. Peter Kraska, a professor of criminal justice.'

## GLOBAL

International migrants made up 4.7 of the global labour force in 2022, [according to](#) the International Labour Organisation.

Gallup [released](#) its *World's Most Important Problem* report for 2025. The global median for **immigration / refugees** in response to the question, 'according to you, what is the most important problem your country is facing currently?' **was 1%**. The economy and work were the global publics' leading concerns. As for immigration, in the UK in 2025, one in five Britons (21%) named immigration as their No. 1 concern, statistically tied with mentions of the economy (23%). By contrast, **immigration barely registers as a top issue elsewhere**. In only six other countries — the Netherlands (13%), Cyprus (13%), Portugal (12%), Malta (12%), Ireland (11%) and the Dominican Republic (11%) — do at least one in 10 adults name immigration as the most important national problem. It is not the top issue in any of them. In countries where at least 5% of adults cite immigration as the top national problem, there is little relationship to total migration levels.

## JUDICIAL OBSERVATORY

### **The European Court of Justice confirms that Germany is obliged to examine an application of an asylum seeker whom Italy refused to readmit**

In a preliminary ruling, the CJEU [ruled](#), in Case C-458/24, that a member state's refusal to take charge of asylum seekers for whom it is responsible under the Dublin III Regulation (604/2013) may ultimately result in the requesting state having to examine an asylum application. A Syrian national entered Germany in April 2023 and applied for asylum. On the basis of the information contained in the Eurodac database, Italy was, however, identified as the member state responsible for examining that application. Germany thus sent a request to Italy take charge of the person. The Italian authorities failed to reply, with the result that they are deemed to have accepted the request, in accordance with Article 22(7) of the Dublin III Regulation. German authorities dismissed the applicant's request for asylum as inadmissible on the ground that the Italian Republic was responsible for examining that application. It also ordered the person's removal to Italy. A German court has asked the CJEU about the consequences which such a refusal may have in terms of the division of responsibility for examining applications. This was in the context that 'the referring court notes that it is apparent from two circulars dated 5 and 7 December 2022 respectively, issued by the Italian 'Dublin' Unit to all other 'Dublin' units, that, provisionally and subject to exceptions, the Italian Republic would no longer accept transfers of applicants for international protection to Italy under the Dublin III Regulation. It thus refuses to take charge of any applicants for whom it is responsible pursuant to that regulation.' The CJEU held that the member state designated as responsible under the criteria laid down in the Dublin III Regulation cannot discharge itself, by a mere unilateral announcement, of its responsibilities under that regulation. However, where the transfer of person concerned to the responsible member state does not take place within the six-month time limit, the member state responsible [here Italy] is relieved of its obligation to take charge of or to take back the person concerned and responsibility is then transferred to the

requesting member state [here Germany]. In order to remedy a possible infringement of the Dublin III Regulation by the member state initially responsible, the European Commission or any other member state may bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations. According to [one commentator](#), the significance of the ruling is also in that the court confirmed that Germany and the European Commission can sue Italy for refusing to process some asylum claims.

## **National elections**

### **Slovenia**

Slovenia held its parliamentary election on 22 March 2026. The **Freedom Movement** (Gibanje Svoboda, Renew Europe) defended a managed and EU-aligned approach to migration, [pointing](#) to new immigration and integration strategies adopted in government, including faster residence procedures. Prime Minister Robert Golob also [highlighted](#) the sharp fall in irregular arrivals in recent years, despite the removal of nearly 116 km of border fencing. The **Slovenian Democratic Party** (SDS, EPP) [advocated](#) stricter border controls, restrictions on family reunification and welfare access, and higher language and integration requirements for labour migrants, while arguing that better economic conditions were [needed](#) to stem the outflow of skilled workers. SDS also [claimed](#) on several occasions that the state had previously spent twice as much taxpayers' money on an illegal migrant as the amount of the minimum wage. The **Social Democrats** (SD, PES) and the **Levica–Vesna coalition** (The Left and Greens, PEL/EGP) placed migration as part of a broader labour and social agenda, [supporting](#) inclusive integration, smoother asylum procedures and a more cooperative EU-centred approach, while [stressing](#) the need for a robust safety net. **Democrats** (unaffiliated) and the joint list of **NSi**, **SLS** and **FOKUS** (EPP) [called](#) for clearer and more restrictive migration policies, [including](#) stronger border management, processing outside the EU and firmer integration requirements. The protest party **Resni.ca** (unaffiliated) [linked](#) migration policies to national identity, including the activation of the domestic labour force to reduce reliance on foreign workers, the prevention of brain drain, and the prioritisation of Slovenian national interests over international mandates. See the results [here](#).

### **Denmark**

An early parliamentary election was held in Denmark on 24 March 2026. The **Social Democrats** (S, S&D) [argued](#) for the externalisation of asylum processing and the deportation of foreign criminals should they be sentenced to a year or more in jail. The party [depicted](#) restrictive migration policies as a *sine qua non* for preserving Denmark's welfare state and social cohesion. PM Mette Frederiksen [suggested](#) that the country use the emergency brake-- a temporary suspension of asylum processing during mass influxes that is part of Danish law—should a refugee movement from the Middle East occur. 'We must avoid at all costs a repeat of the situation in 2015, when more than a million refugees and migrants, especially from Syria, came to Europe,' Frederiksen [said](#). The **Green Left** (SF, Greens/EFA) advocated for the [continuation](#) of refugee resettlement through UN mechanisms, stronger integration support, and cessation of expulsions of foreign students on the basis of insufficient academic activity. The leader of **Venstre** (Renew), Troels Lund

Poulsen, [urged](#) making newly granted citizenships conditional for five years, with the possibility of revocation in cases of serious criminality, while emphasising the importance of maintaining social cohesion. The **Liberal Alliance** (Renew) [proposed](#) an immediate stop for processing asylum applications of people who have arrived in an irregular manner, the denial of citizenship to individuals with ‘anti-democratic values’, and stricter integration requirements. It also [sought](#) to repeal of a 1992 law that put the European Convention of Human Rights above Danish national law, in order to enable deportations. The **Danish People’s Party** (DPP, PfE) [demanded](#) a review of all citizenships granted over the past two decades, the establishment a ministry of repatriation, and measures targeting Muslim communities. The **Moderates** (Renew) [adopted](#) a more pragmatic stance, with FM Rasmussen advocating controlled migration to sustain public trust in the welfare system. The **Conservative People’s Party** (EPP) [advocated](#) policies to foster cultural assimilation to Danish values, swift expulsions of foreign criminals, higher barriers for obtaining citizenship, and measures to prevent parallel societies. The **Red-Green Alliance** (The Left) [opposed](#) the EU’s third-country arrangements and return policies deemed to undermine protection standards, while supporting measures that address ‘root causes’ of migration. The **Social Liberal Party** (Renew) [prioritised](#) equal rights and community integration for migrants, swift access to permanent residence and citizenship, and labour market participation. **Denmark Democrats** (ECR) [called](#) for the stricter cultural adaptation for migrants, lower refugee benefits to boost work, and tougher anti-gang measures. See the results [here](#).

### **SELECT EXTERNAL PUBLICATIONS**

Dutch Advisory Council on Migration, Balanced Labour Migration. *Targeted Labour Migration Policy for General Well-Being*, [AM](#), March 2026

European Network Against Racism and Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants: *Racial Profiling Practices at EU Internal Borders*, [March 2026](#)

Malaconotid, A. *The Evolving Route of Bangladeshi Migration to Italy through Libya*, [Mixed Migration Centre](#), March 2026

Trauner, F. & Zardo, F. ‘The European Commission’s response to national emergency regimes within the EU’s asylum policy: from rejection to accommodation’. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1–23.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2026.2640170>

Kustov, A. and Dai, Y. ‘What is Populism Actually Good for?’, [Popular by Design](#), March 2026

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