



### **The Christian Democratic**

### Origins of the

### **European People's Party:**

### Values and Relevance for Policies

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One does not succeed through Realpolitik alone.<sup>1</sup> Wilfried Martens

#### **Abstract**

The European People's Party (EPP) examined its values at the Bucharest Congress in October 2012. The result of this reassessment, the Bucharest *Party Platform*, affirmed the six core values of the EPP: the dignity of human life in every stage of its existence, freedom and responsibility, equality and justice, truth, solidarity and subsidiarity. These values are inspired by the Christian Democratic philosophy. Although today's EPP includes also parties that do not consider themselves Christian Democratic, all member parties of the EPP draw inspiration from these values. After an exploration of the foundation of the EPP, this paper examines the party's core values, tracing their origins to religious writings. The paper outlines how these values translate into the practical policies of the EPP: the party's response to Europe's economic crisis and addressing issues around free movement and access to social benefits in the EU. The paper demonstrates that values underpin the party's policies but also that practical politics leaves room for interpretation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>W. Martens, Europe: I Struggle, I Overcome (Heidelberg: Springer, 2008), 123.



#### Introduction<sup>2</sup>

Today's EPP is the product of a long evolution. First established as a loose confederation of Christian Democratic parties from Western Europe, it progressively enlarged to include conservative and liberal–conservative parties throughout the continent and became the common political family of the European centre–right. It presents itself as a party of values without confessional or church bindings.<sup>3</sup>

Along with these changes, a thorough reassessment of EPP values and its long-term programme was carried out on several occasions, most notably in Athens in 1992 after the fall of the Iron Curtain and in Berlin in 2001 in the context of the enlargement to include Central and Eastern European centre–right parties. The latest programme reassessment took place in 2012 in Bucharest. The *Party Platform* affirmed the six core values of the EPP: the dignity of human life in every stage of its existence, freedom and responsibility, equality and justice, truth, solidarity and subsidiarity. These values were inspired by a distinctly Christian Democratic philosophy. The variety of traditions and political leanings represented in the EPP has meant that the interpretation of these values has been broadened and has lost some of its original religious connotations and theological justification. This paper therefore emphasises the Christian Democratic origins of the EPP's values, but also respects that today's EPP is more than a Christian Democratic Party and that the EPP's values are shared by parties that do not attach a distinctly Christian Democratic meaning to them.

The paper first presents a short overview of the foundation of the EPP and explores the Christian Democratic origins of its core values; it then illustrates how the framework and outlook provided by those values can still be relevant for understanding and shaping the EPP's answers to some pressing contemporary policy issues. The focus is on the management of the economic crisis and on freedom of movement.

**Keywords** EPP – European People's Party – Values – Origins – Christian Democracy – Centre–right – Economic policy – Freedom of movement



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> We are grateful for the comments and suggestions provided by Jos van Gennip, Roland Freundenstein, Ingrid Habets, Brenda Furniere and Eoin Drea. Special thanks go to Boyan Tanev for his thorough comments on the free movement section.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> EPP, *Party Platform*, final text adopted by the EPP Statutory Congress, Bucharest, 17–18 October 2012, art. 141.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Ibid., 6.



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# The foundation of the EPP: a historical overview

Within a national context, citizens are often broadly acquainted with the origins and core values of major parties. There is less awareness of the evolution and values of European parties. Establishing a continental political structure and agreeing on a common platform are no easy tasks. Reaching a consensus on EPP membership and values has therefore been a long and complex process.

#### Christian Democratic beginnings

The origins of pan-European Christian Democracy can be traced back to December 1945. The first discussions about what would become a force to be reckoned with took place on the occasion of a party conference of the (French) Popular Republican Movement (Mouvement républicain populaire, MRP). It was then that the New International Team (Nouvelles équipes internationales, NEI) was established as a loose network of national parties, individuals and organisations representing Christian Democratic positions. Years later, on 16 June 1953, the Common Assembly of the newly established European Coal and Steel Community passed a resolution enabling the formation of political groups. On that occasion, the NEI played an important role in establishing the first Christian Democratic Group in the Common Assembly.

The NEI charter advocated 'cooperation between groups and individuals in order to exchange experience and information'. There was the ambition to transform the NEI into a more cohesive European transnational structure, but its loose organisation proved impossible to overcome in those early years. It was only in December 1965, after intense internal debate, that the NEI was transformed into the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD). The creation of the EUCD brought about the necessary changes by supporting the Christian Democratic Group in its parliamentary activities,



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> P. van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development: The Globalisation of Socialism and Christian Democracy* 1945–1965 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006), 238.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> W. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 314.



developing political programmes and clarifying the main points of Christian Democratic thinking.<sup>7</sup> The EUCD followed the ideological tradition of the NEI but displayed a more open commitment to European integration.<sup>8</sup>

#### Looking for consensus: the road to a European People's Party

The establishment of the EUCD turned out to be an important step towards the creation of a true European party. On 8 July 1976, the European People's Party–Federation of Christian Democratic Parties from the European Community was founded alongside the EUCD. However, fundamental disagreements on the membership of the new party were apparent from the beginning. The main point of contention had to do with whether the EPP would be open to non–Christian Democratic parties.

The Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, CSU) were in favour of such openness; they wanted to prevent the European Parliament from being dominated by the socialists. They argued that because they were absent from the United Kingdom and Denmark, Christian Democrats were numerically too weak to counterbalance the socialists and therefore should have entered into an alliance with conservatives and liberals.<sup>9</sup>

The Christian Democratic parties from Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Italy opposed this idea. The result was the creation of the European Democratic Union (EDU) in 1978. The EDU comprised conservative parties from Austria, Portugal, France, Denmark, Finland, Norway, the UK, Greece and Sweden, as well the CDU and CSU. It was a platform for European centre–right parties initiated by CDU Chairman Helmut Kohl, British Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher and the President of the French neo-Gaullist Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République, RPR) Jacques Chirac. The EDU was designed to forge durable links and establish cooperation between Christian Democrats and conservatives of other traditions,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>T. Jansen and S. Van Hecke, *At Europe's Service: The Origins and Evolution of the European People's Party* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2011), 31–3.



- <sup>8</sup> S. Van Hecke, *A Reflection on Christian Democratic and Conservative Thought* (Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2008), 10: '. . . Christian Democracy maintains a complex relationship with its sources, both philosophically and historically. It is in part under the influence of religious pluralism and secularisation that the insight has grown that Christian Democracy cannot be the exclusive political representative of Christianity and, conversely, that Christianity is not a political ideology . . . In this sense, it is essential that the source, i.e. the gospel, should not be perceivable as a political manifesto or platform.'
- <sup>9</sup> S. Van Hecke, 'On the Road Towards Transnational Parties in Europe: How and Why the European People's Party Was Founded', *European View* 3 (2006), 153–9.



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with only the German parties maintaining membership of both the EDU and the EPP.<sup>10</sup> The EDU line was even more strongly anti-communist than the EPP's and its economic positions more radically liberal. The result was a structure of three organisations, with a partly overlapping membership (see Figure 1). Thanks to the foundation of the EDU, the EPP was encouraged to engage in a formal dialogue with conservative and liberal-conservative parties throughout Western Europe.

#### Figure 1 Main member parties of the EUCD, EPP and EDU (1978)

EUCD Dimokratikos Synagermos (CY) Partit Nazzjonalista (MA) Christlichdemokratische	EPP CVP (B) PSC (B) ARP (NL) CHU (NL) KVP (NL) Democrazia	EDU CDU (D) CSU (D)	ÖVP (A) Centro	. ,
	` '		Centro Democratico Social (P)	Hoyre (N) Conservative Party (UK) Moderaterna (SE) Nea Demokratia (EL)

*Source*: S. Van Hecke, 'On the Road towards Transnational Parties in Europe: How and Why the European People's Party Was Founded', *European View* 3 (2006).



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> P. Fontaine, Voyage to the Heart of Europe 1953–2009 (Brussels: Racine, 2009), 151.

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### Closer cooperation between Christian Democrats and other centre-right parties

It was the worsening of results in the European elections that eventually prompted closer cooperation between the three centre–right organisations at the European level. After losing its dominance in the European Parliament to the Social Democrats in 1980, the EPP took the lead and promoted a process of rapprochement with centre–right parties from the new member countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece) that did not have a Christian Democratic tradition. Wilfried Martens, President of the EPP between 1992 and 2013, described this development on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the EPP:

If the EPP did not want to be sidelined, its only option was to cooperate with other parties of the same political leaning. The concept of a people's party, inherent to the EPP name, increasingly gained significance. It reflects the fact that there are different political traditions in Europe's different countries, which no European party can afford to ignore.<sup>11</sup>

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the EPP accepted, during the 1990s and 2000s, a number of parties from the former Communist bloc. These parties were Christian Democratic, conservative and liberal–conservative. As a consequence, the EPP became so broad that the existence of another Christian Democratic organisation was no longer justified: the EUCD lost its relevance and in 1999 was merged with the EPP. Similarly, in this new scenario the traditional Christian Democratic reservations about other conservative and liberal–conservative parties declined, so that the EPP accepted most such parties from European countries. Consequently, the EDU also merged with the EPP in 2002. 12

The former EDU Members of the European Parliament, largely from the British Conservative Party and the Czech Civic Democratic Party, renamed themselves European Democrats (ED) and became part of the renamed EPP–ED Group in the European Parliament as a separate subgroup. However, internal differences remained significant and included fundamental disagreements on the ultimate constitutional structure of the EU. On the one hand there was the vision of a 'Europe of nations', a vision defended by British and Scandinavian parties as well as some French Gaullists and Central Europeans; on the other hand there was the longing for a 'European federation' which was cherished by most EPP member parties.<sup>13</sup> This ambiguity came to an end in 2009,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> W. Martens, 'Shaping Europe: 25 Years of the European People's Party', in E. Petroni and J. W. Vlasman (eds.), *Our Vision of Europe* (Leuven-Apeldoorn: Garant, 2001), 234.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Jansen and Van Hecke, At Europe's Service, 98-106.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> S. Zotti, 'The European People's Party: Identity and Integration', in W. Fasslabend and J. Pröll (eds.), *The European People's Party: Successes and Future Challenges* (Vienna: edition noir, 2010).

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when most European Democrats broke away from the EPP and formed the European Conservatives and Reformists. The EPP–ED Group reverted to its original name: the EPP Group. <sup>14</sup> Overall, at the end of this journey, the party remained an open political family advocating centre–right and Christian Democratic values and promoting a pan-European mindset.

# The Christian Democratic origins of the EPP's core values

The core values of the EPP have been examined and reformulated on four occasions. The first EPP platform was drafted in 1978 in Brussels after the founding of the party in 1976. A revised document was produced in 1992 in the wake of the geopolitical earthquakes of the preceding years. A decade later, at the 2001 Berlin Congress, an updating exercise led to the document called *A Union of Values* in the context of the party's rapprochement with conservative and other like-minded forces. This was considered an addition to the 1992 *Basic Programme* and not meant to replace it.<sup>15</sup>

The most recent party document dealing with the core values of the EPP is the *Party Platform*, adopted at the 2012 EPP Statutory Congress in Bucharest. According to the *Platform*, the core values of the EPP are the dignity of human life in every stage of its existence, freedom and responsibility, equality and justice, truth, <sup>16</sup> solidarity and subsidiarity. <sup>17</sup> In what follows, these values will be traced back to the Christian Democratic philosophy that inspired them.

#### The dignity of human life

In the Christian tradition, the root of human dignity is the notion of the human person as the image of God, as it appears in the first book of Genesis: 'Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness"'. <sup>18</sup> The thirteenth-century philosopher and theologian St Thomas Aquinas is a central figure in the elaboration of this concept. He emphasised the idea of the human being as a spiritual soul, endowed with intellect and free will and having domination over himself (*per se potestativum sui*). Man is therefore



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Jansen and Van Hecke, *At Europe's Service*, 243–52.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Truth made its appearance as an EPP core value in the Bucharest 2012 *Party Platform* on page six. It has not been elaborated as thoroughly as the other five principles and therefore is left out of this analysis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> EPP, Party Platform, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Genesis 1:26, English Standard Version.

the originating principle of his own actions.<sup>19</sup> Every man and every woman is considered a unique human being who is irreplaceable and free by nature and thus shares the same rights and obligations. Since people are assumed to be free, responsible and interdependent, they are encouraged to take part in civil society and obliged to do their best to improve it.

The implications of the principle are of vast importance for current EPP policy. The concepts of the human person and human dignity are often influential in contemporary discussions well beyond the religious sphere, for example in philosophy, anthropology and politics.<sup>20</sup> The notion of human dignity can also provide valuable insights in current debates on ethics, life completion, biogenetics and multicultural society.

Human dignity as one of the EPP's core values made its first appearance in the Athens 1992 Basic Programme. Man is considered the subject and not the object of history. The programme affirms the inalienable dignity of every human being and acknowledges Judaeo-Christian values and Hellenic–Roman heritage as its foundation.<sup>21</sup> The member parties of the EPP reaffirmed this notion in the Bucharest 2012 Party Platform.<sup>22</sup>

#### Freedom and responsibility

The value of freedom and responsibility builds on the notion of human dignity in the sense that freedom means autonomy and responsibility, as opposed to an undesirable dependence on higher governmental authorities. In this sense, freedom and responsibility reinforce each other. In the spirit of Aquinas, a person is radically free and has the right and freedom of responsible self-creation and self-fulfilment,<sup>23</sup> but he is also obliged to offer his talents and abilities to the community.

The freedom and responsibility of the Christian tradition offer a distinctive contribution to centre–right policies, for example in an ecological context. In fact, the Christian responsibility of everyone vis-à-vis the created world provides a foundation for environmental policy more ancient than the communitarian arguments of the left. Furthermore, the theological principle of stewardship offers solid ground to justify intergene-



- <sup>19</sup>T. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica Part I* (1256), translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Hamburg: Project Gutenberg License, 2006).
- <sup>20</sup> J. J. S. Aguas, 'The Notions of the Human Person and Human Dignity in Aquinas and Wojtyla', *Kritike* 3/1 (2009), 40–60.
- <sup>21</sup> EPP, *Basic Programme*, final text adopted by the ninth EPP Congress, Athens, 12–14 November 1992, 3–4.
- <sup>22</sup> EPP, Party Platform, 6.
- <sup>23</sup> Aguas, 'The Notions of the Human Person', 40-60.



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rational solidarity in the environmental field. According to this principle, human beings are God's stewards on earth. Thus, they may reap the fruits of the earth but should refrain from destroying or polluting God's creation,<sup>24</sup> which is a gift to preserve for future generations.

The core principle of freedom and responsibility is also central to the social market economy, the economic model historically favoured by Christian Democratic parties and one that strives to combine a market-based economic system with the provision of social protection and services. This entails a commitment to the protection of individual freedom and the recognition of free entrepreneurial initiatives on the basis of fair competition. Strongly supported by EPP member parties, a 'highly competitive social market economy' has been included by the Lisbon Treaty among the goals towards which the EU will work.

Finally, the principle of freedom and responsibility implies an overarching vision of the relationship between citizens and governmental authorities and derives the legitimacy of the latter from their ability to establish the appropriate conditions for the personal development of the former. The Christian Democratic approach to government should be viewed as a move away from past imperialist and statist structures and ideologies towards a more normative Christian realisation of the rule of law.

The EPP has referred to *freedom* as one of its core values since the Brussels 1978 *Political Programme*. The programme stated that the EPP would 'safeguard human rights and basic freedoms as a foundation for the development of the individual and for the establishment of a just society.'<sup>27</sup> In the same document, the principle of *responsibility* was viewed in the context of Europe assuming responsibility for the Third World and safeguarding world peace.<sup>28</sup> Freedom and responsibility as a single core value was introduced in the Athens 1992 *Basic Programme*, emphasising responsibility vis-à-vis the created world and considering freedom to be an essential condition of true justice.<sup>29</sup> The 2001 document *A Union of Values*<sup>30</sup> and the Bucharest 2012 *Party Platform*<sup>31</sup> reaffirmed this.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> P. Lucardie, 'Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained? Christian Democracy in the Netherlands', in E. Gerrard and S. Van Hecke (eds.), *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe Since the End of the Cold War* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004), 169.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> K. Grabow and M. Schäfer, *Christian Democracy: Principles and Policy-Making* (Sankt-Augustin/Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., 2011), 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Art. 3, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> EPP, *Political Programme*, final text adopted by the first EPP Congress, Brussels, 6–7 March 1978, 1. <sup>28</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> EPP, *Basic Programme*, Athens, 1992, 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> EPP, A Union of Values, final text adopted by the fourteenth EPP Congress, Berlin, 11–13 January 2001, 25–6.

<sup>31</sup> EPP, Party Platform, 7-8.

#### **Equality and justice**

The origins of the core principle of equality can be traced back to the Bible. The notion that all men are created equal, because they share the same origin and the same nature, is at the root of the Christian conception of a human being. It is logical that it should feature prominently in the platform of a party whose origins were eminently Christian Democratic. The importance attached to equality also accounts for the openness of Christian Democratic parties to social justice, and it is evident in their tendency to stress that the state, social partners and civil society are responsible for ensuring social justice through legislation.

As to the notion of justice cherished by Christian Democrats, its beginnings are certainly associated with the ancient Christian tradition of natural law, insisting on the natural endowments and rights of human beings as creatures of God. Deprived of its original, religious inspiration in the political and social thinking of the Enlightenment, this notion became the basis of all the solemn declarations of human rights put forward in the following centuries. Nowadays, the principle of justice accounts for the EPP commitment to respecting European and international treaties on human rights such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man as well as the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, was included in the Bucharest *Party Platform*.<sup>32</sup>

Equality and justice as core values were first presented in the 1978 Political Programme: 'The political community must give individuals and organizations scope to develop to the full their capacity to operate on their own responsibility . . . In this spirit we are ready to fight against injustice, discrimination and poverty.'<sup>33</sup> It was elaborated in the 1992 Basic Programme: 'All human beings are equal because they are endowed with the same dignity . . . The same rights must be recognised and the same duties imposed according to each person's capabilities.'<sup>34</sup> In 2001, A Union of Values added 'European integration is an essential contribution to promote justice.'<sup>35</sup> The 2012 Bucharest Party Platform reaffirmed this.<sup>36</sup>



- <sup>32</sup> EPP, Party Platform, 9.
- <sup>33</sup> EPP, *Political Programme*, 1.
- <sup>34</sup> EPP, *Basic Programme*, 5.
- 35 EPP, A Union of Values, 14.
- <sup>36</sup> EPP, Party Platform, 9.



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#### Subsidiarity

Traditionally, Christian Democratic thinking attaches great significance to the dispersion of state power by decentralisation. Indeed, the origins of subsidiarity lie in the social tradition and teaching of the Catholic Church. The concept was first mentioned in the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (*Of New Things*)<sup>37</sup> in 1891 and further developed in the encyclical *Quadregesimo Anno* (*In the Fortieth Year*)<sup>38</sup> in 1931. These two documents deal with the relationship between the state and subordinate groups and provide an analysis of the role of individuals in society. In *Quadragesimo Anno*, Section 79, Pope Pius XI states: 'It is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry.' Subsidiarity assumes that people are by nature social beings and emphasises the importance of social groups such as the family, the church and voluntary organisations as structures favouring the development of the individual and the vitality of civil society.

The Catholic principle of subsidiarity has a parallel in the notion of sphere sovereignty introduced in the Dutch Calvinist tradition by Abraham Kuyper, founder of the first Dutch Christian Democratic party (the Anti-Revolutionary Party) in 1879. The concept referred to the empowerment of 'intermediate bodies' in society such as universities, industries and families. Kuyper stressed that each of these bodies should be sovereign in its own sphere, and strived to prevent politics from interfering unnecessarily with their organisation and functioning. The main difference between the Catholic principle and its Protestant counterpart lies in the Catholic distinction between 'higher and lower spheres' (from the Roman Church to the state and then civil society associations and families), whereas Kuyper takes a more horizontal approach, inspired by his Protestant upbringings. Both views, however, reject the absolutism of the state and the individual, accept the notion of a created social order and seek to strengthen intermediate associations.<sup>39</sup>

The difference between the vertical approach of the Catholic tradition and the more horizontal view of Protestant thinking is partly responsible for the origin of the crucial distinction between horizontal and vertical subsidiarity in the EU. Vertical subsidiarity deals with the distribution of powers between authorities on different levels: suprana-



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum* (Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1891).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno* (Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1931).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> K. A. Van Til, 'Subsidiarity and Sphere-sovereignty: A Match Made in . . . ?' *Theological Studies* 69/3 (2008), 610–36.



tional (EU), national (member states) and subnational (regions) or local.<sup>40</sup> Horizontal subsidiarity deals with the limitations of EU and governmental interventions vis-à-vis societal initiatives<sup>41</sup> and leaves room for self-regulation by social actors wherever possible.

#### Subsidiarity in the EU

The principle of subsidiarity has become a general principle of EU law. When applied in the context of the EU, it serves to regulate the exercise of the Union's non-exclusive powers. It rules out EU intervention when an issue can be dealt with effectively by member states at national, regional or local level and means that the Union is justified in exercising its powers only when member states are unable to satisfactorily achieve the objectives of a proposed action.

Since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality has enabled national parliaments to scrutinise draft legislation with specific regard to compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. Altional parliaments are now empowered to issue reasoned opinions when they consider that a proposal breaches the principle. If reasoned opinions against the proposal represent at least one-third of the votes allocated to the national parliaments, the draft must be reviewed.

The principle of subsidiarity is therefore a prime example of a normatively inspired idea that, originating in nineteenth-century Christian teaching, has been translated into policy and accepted as a general principle of EU law. Today, it thus inspires not only the EPP but the EU as a whole.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> European Commission, Opinion on the communication concerning the application of the Agreement on Social Policy presented by the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, OJ C397 (31 December 1994), 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> J. Van Gennip, 'Subsidiariteit in Europa: beginsel en werkelijkheid', in J. Van De Gronden, B. Van Horck and M. Neuteboom (eds.), *Christendemocratische Verkenningen: Het uur van Europa* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2013), 109.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Ibid., art. 6.



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The principle of *subsidiarity* was introduced in the 1978 *Political Programme*, where it was stated that 'political power should be decentralised wherever possible.'<sup>44</sup> A concrete elaboration of the principle of subsidiarity was presented in the 1992 *Basic Programme*. In the chapter 'Our Vision of Society' the programme states that 'the Christian Democratic vision of society is based on the principle of subsidiarity and public authorities must recognise the relative autonomy of social groups and not take the place of private initiative unless the latter is weak or non-existent.'<sup>45</sup> Since then, the principle of *subsidiarity* has been included in all the EPP documents on core values.

#### Solidarity

The main distinctive quality of the Christian Democratic perception of solidarity lies in its relationship with other Christian Democratic principles such as subsidiarity and individual freedom, responsibility and self-realisation. From this perspective, solidarity simply means protecting those living in poverty and deprivation so as to allow them to stand by themselves and freely make their own decisions independent of permanent government support. Furthermore, Christian Democratic thinking stresses the relative autonomy of social organisations in the context of a plural society and therefore values civil society solidarity through charities. The central aim of state-administered solidarity should be to ensure harmony between various groups and organisations in society, not to eliminate any difference in income and social conditions.

It is not difficult to see that this approach is fundamentally different from the Social Democratic notion of solidarity. The scope of state interventions aimed at ensuring solidarity is far less limited in Social Democratic thinking and there is a much stronger emphasis on the primacy of politics. Not faced with the limits provided by the principles of subsidiarity and individual responsibility, Social Democracy is comfortable with a much more interventionist state using its powers to eliminate inequality, which is seen as inherent to the capitalist system of production. Instead, the traditional Christian Democratic view of capitalism, as a system of production based on private ownership and enterprise, accepts that various social groups and classes have their own specific and indispensable roles in the division of labour. Cooperation between classes is not only possible, but also necessary and natural.<sup>46</sup>



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> EPP, *Political Programme*, 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> EPP, *Basic Programme*, 7–8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> K. Van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State* (London: Routledge, 1995), 183–4.

The principle of *solidarity* has been present in all the aforementioned EPP documents, from 1978 on. Often, the principle of solidarity is coupled with the principle of subsidiarity. The 1978 *Political Programme* states: 'Our social policy is based on the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. This means helping others to help themselves and implies a duty to ensure that social justice is maintained. The political community must give individuals and organisations scope to develop to the full of their capacity to operate on their own responsibility.'<sup>47</sup>

### The policy relevance of EPP values

The EPP values can still serve as a basis from which politicians and decision-makers can approach the policy problems of the day and which can make them receptive to certain solutions. However, examples of practical policies also show the difficulties and ambiguities that exist when applying these values. The compromises and mediations typical of political action make it ill-suited to the purity of abstract principles. In democratic politics mundane factors intervene to water down principled commitments or even make them impossible to follow through. These include voters' preferences, economic circumstances, the influence of organised interests, the role of the media and countries' international obligations, among many others. Finally, the EPP has become a large and diverse political family. Though all member parties are broadly supportive of EPP values, interpretations of the party's value platform may differ.

Below, the relevance of some Christian Democratic principles for EPP policy positions is shown with regard to the management of the recent economic crisis and the freedom of movement of EU citizens.

#### Facing the economic crisis

It has now been six years since Europe first realised that it was facing an economic crisis of extraordinary depth and complexity. Originating in the US housing market in 2007, this economic earthquake shook the foundations of the European banking system and soon evolved into crises of banking and public finance.



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> EPP, *Basic Programme*, 6.



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Since the crisis began, broad consensus has existed among political leaders around the world that something went wrong in the previous decades of financial deregulation and that irresponsible risk-taking by banks and other financial investors had been allowed. The EPP and its member parties were among the most outspoken in stressing the moral argument that was the basis of calls for changes in the financial system, structural reforms and an overhaul of EU economic governance.

The insistence on the ethical foundations underpinning crisis management initiatives was already evident in the early interventions agreed upon to deal with the destabilising effects of the US subprime crisis. French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel took the lead in calls for a 'moralisation' of capitalism and a tighter regulatory framework for financial transactions.<sup>48</sup> The first tangible signs of progress were evident at the 2009 G20 summit in London, where a strengthening of financial supervision and regulation at the global level was agreed to and the new Financial Stability Board was established. In addition, the EPP group in the European Parliament was influential in shaping the Financial Supervision Package that strengthened oversight in the EU by establishing the European Systemic Risk Board and, later on, three new European Supervisory Authorities.

A return to basic values has underpinned the EPP approach even when the economic crisis directly spilled over into public finances. When Greece and later Ireland and Portugal were shut out of the financial markets, rescue operations were set up to support them, and the commitment to the integrity of the currency area by EPP leaders was unflinching. German Chancellor Angela Merkel referred to the monetary union as a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*, a community of fate.<sup>49</sup> The Euro Group, the body of finance ministers from the eurozone, then headed by EPP leader Jean-Claude Junker, ignored widespread calls to let Greece fail because of the potentially high costs of financially supporting it.

Thus, the EPP itself demonstrated that, as the EU's largest political force, it also acts as the party of responsibility. It also tried to live up to the high standards of solidarity set by the Christian Democratic fathers of Europe. This solidarity did not take the form of unconditional transfers and was instead accompanied by rigorous requirements to conduct structural reforms. A normative justification can be found in the EPP value framework. From this perspective, solidarity cannot be decoupled from the freedom and



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Deutsche Welle, 'French, German Leaders Call for "Moralization" of Capitalism', 8 January 2009.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Tagesenzeiger, 'Die Währungsunion ist eine Schicksalsgemeinschaft', 19 May 2010.



responsibility of its beneficiaries, and freedom and responsibility themselves cannot be divided from each other. Therefore, the attempt to build a tighter structure of rules in order to ensure economic responsibility as a condition of financial solidarity was normatively defensible based on the EPP value platform.

It is also worth stressing the differences between the approach of the EPP and the European socialists to managing the crisis. In the diagnosis of the crisis, the socialists tended to insist on the inherent evils of capitalism and the need for public authorities to step in and remedy them. In contrast, the EPP stressed the moral responsibility of individuals and firms and saw the new regulatory framework as providing the right incentives for individual and societal action.

It was the emphasis on responsibility that set apart the Christian Democratic and socialist conceptions of interpersonal and international solidarity. The socialist approach implies a mechanical conception of solidarity whereby those who have more are coerced by public authorities into supporting those who have less without regard for the moral merits of either. Thus, modern Social Democracy sees the state as an active force in shaping a better order for its citizens here and now. As exemplified in the words of Lord Keynes, in 'the long-run we're all dead'. The socialist tradition does not add the interests of future generations into the equation of democratic politics.

In the Christian Democratic tradition, the freedom and moral responsibility of individuals are understood differently. In Christian Democratic thought, the state is merely the guardian of an order that it has not itself created and whose aim is the material and spiritual betterment of individuals in each generation. The Christian Democratic tradition has an ancient principle to offer: the principle of stewardship. We have previously mentioned this with reference to environmental policy, but this principle can usefully serve to justify the notion that we should never abuse our present wealth so as to overburden future generations with debts and liabilities they are not responsible for.<sup>50</sup>

#### Freedom of movement and access to welfare benefits



Since the creation of Christian Democracy in the late nineteenth century, Christian Democratic politics has remained open in most countries to the ideal of a brotherhood among the European nations that goes beyond linguistic divisions. This notion was propagated by the Christian Democratic fathers of Europe—Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi. Commitment to free movement stems from these intellectual roots as well as from the determination to create a single economic market in Europe.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> G. Kolev and J. Matthes, *Smart Fiscal Consolidation: A Strategy for Achieving Sustainable Public Finances and Growth* (Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2013), 6.



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Today, freedom of movement is a core principle of the EU. It was originally granted in the Treaty of Rome (1957) as one of the four fundamental economic freedoms of the common market: free movement of goods, services, labour and capital.<sup>51</sup> At the time it entailed only the right of workers from the European Economic Community (EEC) countries to take up employment in another member state and settle there after having been employed.<sup>52</sup> It was through the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that the scope of the free movement of workers was progressively widened to become the free movement of persons, implying a wealth of social and cultural dimensions beyond the purely economic one.<sup>53</sup> The ECJ is also responsible for extending the notion of 'worker' to include job seekers and not only recruited workers.<sup>54</sup>

The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht offered a more encompassing notion of European citizenship, complementing the national citizenships of countries joining the newly established EU. From then on, freedom of movement was codified as a right of European citizens. The abolition of any discrimination based on nationality with respect to employment, remuneration, and other conditions of work and employment was explicitly stated to ensure the widest freedom of movement to workers. 56

These liberalising provisions took on new economic significance with the four waves of enlargement in 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden), 2004 (Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary), 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 2013 (Croatia).<sup>57</sup> The last three enlargements, advocated by EPP leaders, welcomed countries from Central and Eastern Europe whose average level of economic development and standard of living were below those of their Western partners. In order to address fears of economically motivated migration from the east and of wage dumping, the full implementation of the free movement of persons and workers was subjected to a transitional period of up to seven years after enlargement. Each EU member state could determine when it was ready to open up its labour market to workers from the new members within this seven-year period.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Art. 39, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> E. Baldoni, *The Free Movement of Persons in the European Union: A Legal-Historical Overview*, PIONEUR Working Paper no. 2 (July 2003).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> D. O'Keeffe, 'Freedom of Movement for Workers in Community Law', in J. Y. Carlier and M. Verwilghen (eds.), *Thirty Years of Free Movement of Workers in Europe: Proceedings of the Conference—Brussels, 17 to 19 December 1998* (European Commission, DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion; and the Catholic University of Leuven, 1998).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Case C-292/89, *The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Gustaff Desiderius Antonissen* [1991] ECR I-745.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Art. 49, TFEU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Ibid., art. 45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> H. Brady, 'David Cameron and EU Migration: Nasty, Visionary—or Just Necessary?', Centre for European Reform (5 December 2013).



At the end of December 2013, the transitional periods for Romania and Bulgaria expired and all Romanians and Bulgarians now enjoy the right to access the labour market without a work permit in any EU member country. Citizens of the countries which joined in 2004 have enjoyed free access since 2011. Croatia's transitional arrangements will only end in 2020. Around 2009, concerns began emerging over 'welfare tourism', the allegation that citizens from Central and East European member states could travel to Western member states in order to draw on the generous social welfare provisions.

Data released so far do not suggest that welfare tourism is a widespread phenomenon. A much more important motivation for migration for the citizens of the Central and East European member states seems to be seeking work. Nevertheless, the debate is likely to continue over the cultural effects of free movement, spurred by concerns in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, France and the UK; certain areas in those countries have been experiencing a growth in the numbers of migrants, creating protests at local and national levels.

The EPP cannot but take up the debate from the perspective of its values. The application of freedom and responsibility is relatively straightforward here. The EPP has always promoted and, when it was necessary, defended freedom of movement within the EU. Christian social thinking makes the EPP supportive of the widest notion of free movement, well beyond the purely economically motivated. In practical policy, freedom of movement has allowed citizens to seek employment or self-employment across the EU, thus responsibly contributing to the economy of the new country and not relying on government benefits without a legitimate reason. Abuse of a social benefit of a host country is an irresponsible act, of course. It can, and should, be dealt with by mechanisms that the host country already has in place.

The application of the concept of equality to free movement within the EU is also straightforward. The Christian Democratic principle of equality applies to all EU citizens. The same goes for the EU's principle of equal treatment, which is based not only on worker status but also on EU citizenship.<sup>60</sup> Limiting free movement within the EU



- <sup>58</sup> In a number of member states, access to the labour market was allowed during the transitional periods on the condition that the worker acquired a work permit. For some jobs no work permit was required. In Germany, for instance, permanent work permits were issued to highly qualified people.
- <sup>59</sup> B. Tanev and V. Novotný, *Free Movement IN FOCUS: Is One of the EU's Freedoms at Risk?*, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (Brussels, June 2014).
- <sup>60</sup> E. Poptcheva, *Freedom of Movement and Residence of EU Citizens: Access to Social Benefits,* European Parliamentary Research Service (Brussels, 10 June 2014), 4.



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would be a clear contradiction of these two principles. Also, by economic calculation, there can be no practical objection to the rule that EU citizens are entitled to receive social benefits anywhere in the Union if they have contributed to the public finances of the host country and need such support.

The examination of free movement and access to benefits from the angle of solidarity is potentially more problematic. Debate continues on the extent of solidarity in those cases where the individual concerned has not contributed to the national public budget, for example by drawing unemployment benefits without having worked in the country. Does solidarity extend to nationals of the given country or does it extend to those EU citizens who currently reside in the given country? This question is closely tied to the principle of subsidiarity: governments of some member states complain that the ECJ has, through its rulings, encroached on their national competences by requiring them to pay welfare benefits to EU citizens from other member states.<sup>61</sup>

From the viewpoint of solidarity, the imperative to help vulnerable people in need applies to all individuals who currently reside on the territory of the country in question. However, it may well be that national political cultures are not ready for a solution that implies such a high level of solidarity between national taxpayers and unemployed citizens from other EU countries.

Thus, the principles of freedom and equality appear to clash with certain understandings of solidarity and subsidiarity. This shows that the application of philosophical principles to politics is possible but often not easy.





#### Conclusion

Establishing a common programme of basic ideas and values remains an exercise every political generation needs to undertake in order to adjust to a changing society and respond to new challenges. The EPP core values have been debated, affirmed, adjusted and reaffirmed from 1978 to 2012 as a result of the ever-changing national, European and international order. All existing member parties and all candidates for membership have to commit to these values.

On the basis of the above exploration of the origins of the core principles of Christian Democratic and centre-right thinking, we can conclude that the EPP core values—the dignity of human life in every stage of its existence, freedom and responsibility, equality and justice, solidarity and subsidiarity—reinforce each other. They form a consistent value system which distinguishes the EPP from other (European) political parties whose values wield a different normative foundation.

We have demonstrated how the EPP's values translate into practical policies. These values have underpinned the party's response to Europe's economic crisis and they inspire the debate on free movement and access to social benefits. The analysis of these policies also shows that practical politics challenges the coherence of these values, creates conflicts and opens up room for interpretation.

In diagnosing the causes of the economic and financial crisis, the EPP stressed the moral responsibility of governments, individuals and firms. In tackling the crisis, it has been conscious of its responsibility to future generations, and kept in mind solidarity between the EU member states, while also insisting that those who received help take responsibility for improving their public finances and financial regulations.

In discussing mobility and the use of welfare benefits by migrant workers, the EPP's commitment to freedom of movement and equality runs into a nationally based understanding of solidarity and certain views on subsidiarity. This shows how there can be some limitations when it comes to applying core values in practical politics.



The EPP's values nevertheless remain in place to aid further discussions of the economy, freedom of movement and other policy areas.

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